

Current History

NOVEMBER, 1961

FOR READING TODAY . . . FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

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Coming Next Month...

THE NATIONS OF ASIA AND SOUTH ASIA

December, 1961

Our December issue analyzes the progress in Asia and South Asia, in a continuing effort to keep up with fast-moving events in the area. Six contributors assess developments in the following countries:

FORMOSA AND "THE CHINA ISSUE" by *Werner Levi*, Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota; and author of "Free India in Asia";

THE STRENGTH OF SOUTH VIETNAM by *Thomas E. Ennis*, Professor of Modern European and Asian History, and author of "Eastern Asia";

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INDONESIA by *Amry Vandenbosch*, Director, Patterson School of Diplomacy, University of Kentucky, and author of "Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815: A Study in Small Power Politics";

JAPAN by *Paul M. A. Linebarger*, Professor of Asiatic Politics, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and author of "Far Eastern Governments and Politics."

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Because greater understanding between East and West has become our crucial need, our November issue is devoted to an analysis of Soviet foreign and domestic policies. Our introductory article assesses Soviet hostility to a United Nations acting as a force for peace. Ross N. Berkes writes:

"... Whether because of ideological blinders, or because of a realistic estimate of consequences, or because of both, the Soviet Union may well have concluded that it cannot afford to allow the United Nations to play a significant role in world affairs." Discussing Khrushchev's "troika" principle, this author notes that "it is probably the potentialities of the Secretary General's role in the manifestations of the 'United Nations Presence' that disturb the Soviet Union."

The Soviet Union in the United Nations

By ROSS N. BERKES

*Director of the School of International Relations,
University of Southern California*

WE SHALL BEGIN with the end, and quote Secretary Dean Rusk's remarkable passage of mid-summer that "The underlying crisis of our generation arises from the fact that the Soviet Union did not join the United Nations in fact, as well as in form, and lend itself to the commitments they and the rest of us made in the midst of a great war."

What may be even more remarkable is that the rapid erosion of Western voting strength in the United Nations has been accompanied by greater Russian hostility to the organization, rather than by lesser hostility. There would appear no logical reason why Russian performance during the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly (1960-1961) was so hostile, particularly since the Soviet Union was surrounded by increasing numbers of uncommitted states, most of whom can ordinarily be tempted into voting propositions rigged up by the Soviet bloc. Whatever the reason, logical or otherwise, Soviet discomfort and

bitterness in and with the United Nations has increased considerably, and the Congo crisis has been more the symbol than the cause.

It is relevant to note here that *The Economist* of London constructed an extraordinary chart early in November, 1960, to portray voting behavior on certain key cold war issues at the outset of the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly. Among other revelations, it was graphically apparent that "Except on the Chinese seat issue, Soviet isolation remained painfully clear."

One key to this declining zest may be found in the observation that what has happened to the United Nations over the years has been not only the vast increase in the number of uncommitted states, but also a decreasing tolerance for using the United Nations as an instrument to prosecute the cold war. This is not to say—and here is a departure from the views of many—that the Soviet bloc was ever particularly successful in exploiting the United Nations

in this manner. (By and large, we were more successful.) Rather, it is to suggest that the Soviet Union will be more unhappy in a United Nations increasingly preoccupied with issues basically irrelevant to the cold war.

It would seem clear, in any case, that the future of the United Nations will depend on its capacity to function in place of the Great Powers. This image was projected by the brilliant late Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, under the phrase "Preventive Diplomacy." Now, a future so dependent on an international organization will be difficult for Americans to accept; increasing numbers of Americans are already protesting that we are being "used" by the United Nations. Quite apparently this will be no easier for the Soviet Union, since the Communist world is even less capable of perspective and sophistication.

The reasons why the Soviet Union conducted itself so reprehensibly in the Congo crisis may go considerably beyond stated Russian objections to the way Hammarskjöld handled the United Nations' role; these reasons might include even more importantly, if not so publicly, a basic objection to any successful role played by the United Nations in such crises. It may not be possible for a Communist mind to concede that a success which is not a Communist success is not necessarily a success for the wicked imperialists, either. They may be right, much to the surprise of the wicked imperialists themselves. In any case, whether because of ideological blinders, because of a realistic estimate of consequences, or because of both, the Soviet Union may well have concluded that it cannot afford to allow the United Nations to play a significant role in world affairs. Even more, it may have decided that a United Nations capable of playing an independent role was more of a threat than a United Nations operating as a vehicle of the capitalist warmongers.

Apart from the Congo, where the antagonistic views of the Soviet Union were shared by quite a few—if by no means all—of the African states, the Soviet has not revealed much capacity to exploit the manifest grounds for harmony with the non-Western world. Even the West has begun to learn

that there is increasingly more to the modern United Nations than propaganda victories or defeats, although one might question whether public tolerance of the United Nations in our own country is not conditioned by now to its usefulness as a vehicle of propaganda. But it is difficult to discover what, if anything, the Soviet finds in the United Nations except for propaganda. In the picturesque language of General Charles de Gaulle, the Soviet Union is one of those states "for whom international life is made up of perpetual invective." The day the Soviet Union introduces the slightest idea unrelated to its venomous hostility toward the West, or even recognizes the comparative unrelatedness of some idea, will be an important day in United Nations history.

Tactics vs. Substance

The issue at hand, however, is the Soviet relationship in the United Nations with the uncommitted world, or rather, the inability of the Soviet to take more advantage of a shared suspiciousness of the West. An overriding reason might well be the Soviet tendency to regard nearly all issues in tactical terms, and to do so blatantly. At no time in United Nations history has this been more apparent than during the past year, when nearly every response of the Soviet Union turned out to be more tactical than substantive. Take disarmament: the Soviet interest was in having this subject debated in plenary session, or in having a special session on the issue. In either case, the major result would be a parade of propaganda speeches in place of serious negotiation.

Take also the expansion of ECOSOC and the Security Council. Soviet championship of this egalitarian project, particularly dear to the hearts of the new and uncommitted states of Asia and Africa, became of minor importance upon the concurrence of the West. The Soviet Union thereupon moved to the more difficult position of insisting on victory in the China question as prerequisite to formal agreement to what it had already agreed to in principle. This may be sharp international politics to some, but to others it must surely have appeared as descending to the principles of the cheaper bazaars.

There are many other examples from the record of the Fifteenth Session to illustrate

the high cynicism of Soviet preoccupation with tactics, such as the Soviet-led campaign for a declaration against colonialism. With Western colonialism essentially reduced to control over miniscule populations, or to the most stubborn and complex of remaining problems, and with Communist colonialism somehow excluded from the classification, it seemed particularly artificial and calculated for Khrushchev suddenly and dramatically to demand the end of colonialism by 1961. It was the influence of uncommitted states that erased the time element from the final document, and surely not without recognition that Soviet interest in the declaration was far more its nuisance value against the West than its inherent worth as a principle.

"Who," asked orator Khrushchev of the General Assembly, "can turn a deaf ear to the groans of the people of Oman?" One might suppose that the answer is, "Quite a few, including the Soviet Union." But with all respect to the downtrodden people of Oman, it seems somewhat pale and anticlimactic to find the mighty leader of the Soviet Union directing the wandering attention of the world ultimately to Oman.

One could cite the Soviet opposition to Mauretania's admission to the United Nations as a further example of the Russian preoccupation with tactics. This somewhat surprising move, coming as it did immediately after the West had succeeded in blocking the admission of Outer Mongolia, could be seen as a spite move. Others saw it as a sudden and opportunistic cultivation of Morocco. But none regarded the Soviet position of opposing and thus excluding Mauretania from admission to the United Nations as more than the crudest calculation of Soviet interest and advantage.

It is the concept of the "United Nations presence," however, that brings forth the most telling Soviet hostility. The Soviet Union has paid not a penny of its assessment for the United Nations Expeditionary Force operating between Egypt and Israel. Nor, of course, has it paid any part of its share of the cost for the United Nations forces in the Congo. Its steadfast opposition has directly imperiled the operations and future of both. This opposition continues despite the fact that successful U.N. functioning has helped to keep the Western

powers out of the respective areas, or at least has contributed to the stabilization of the area without Western influence. Someone ought to recall, and not least the Soviet Union, that the Lumumba Government asked the United States to come into the Congo before it asked the United Nations to do so.

Perhaps one can assume that Soviet antagonism to the concept of the "United Nations presence" relates to the remarkable and astonishingly perceptive comment by Khrushchev, apropos of disarmament inspection and control, that while there are neutral countries there are no neutral men. In any case, it is a pleasing irony that Soviet hostility to this somewhat delicate but highly promising formula of "presence" is in almost direct ratio to neutralist enthusiasm for it. And to add a less pleasing irony, the rock upon which the concept will likely founder is American hostility toward being presented with the bill.

One would be tempted to conclude at this point that the Soviet stake in the United Nations hinges on the success of its efforts to destroy the Secretary General—not the person, perhaps, but certainly the office. Deeper than Hammarskjöld's role in the Congo, it is probably the potentialities of the Secretary General's role in manifestations of the "United Nations Presence" that disturb the Soviet Union. As Khrushchev argued in the General Assembly on October 3, 1960:

At present one man is interpreter and executant of all the decisions of the Assembly and the Security Council. . . . This one man . . . must interpret and execute the decisions of the Assembly and the Security Council with due consideration for the interests of the countries of monopoly capital, the interests of the Socialist countries, and the interests of the neutralist countries. But this is impossible. . . .

The capitalist world has its own ethics, the Communist world has its own, and the neutralist countries have their own. Therefore . . . we must ensure such a structure of the U.N. apparatus as will reflect the actual state of affairs in the world and express the interests of the different groups of States. . . .

It would be wise to reread these Khrushchev excerpts, and to ponder their far-reaching meaning. They provide the background for Khrushchev's revealing complaint that

"Mr. Hammarskjöld has never been objective towards the Socialist countries." He is quite right, you know. And those who find it difficult to entertain the concept of a biased objectivity perhaps should be reintroduced to ideological politics—way out at the end of logic.

The Meaning of "Troika"

It is at least arguable that Khrushchev's three-man Secretariat—the "troika" proposal—can be understood in only one way: as a clever method of stultifying the concept of the "United Nations presence" through shackling the Secretary General, and of making the operation palatable to the very nations that have the greatest stake in the concept: the uncommitted states of Asia and Africa. In the framework of the Soviet proposal, the destruction of the Secretary General has been a comparatively harmless gambit, incapable of adoption and implementation as long as it drew the opposition of the West. As Dean Rusk put it:

There is no way that the Soviet Union can impose his [Khrushchev's] proposal. This would mean an amendment of the Charter which requires the consent of the United States and other permanent members of the Security Council. We would not consent, nor would the necessary two-thirds of the General Assembly. The United Nations will not destroy itself.

To insist that the world, like all Gaul, is divided into three parts is, of course, not exclusively a Soviet image. But the acceptance of this view by most of the uncommitted nations has made the representational aspects of the Soviet proposal most appealing to them. Like the Soviet Union, they are beginning to feel the need for a Secretary General who—as Khrushchev so delicately put it—is objective toward them. Moreover, it was the imaginative resourcefulness of leaders of the uncommitted group, particularly Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, that showed the Soviet bloc how to get around the constitutional barrier of Western hostility. By the simple invention of three "Deputy Secretaries General," with clearly defined authority and "not merely as assistants" to Hammarskjöld, statesman Nkrumah may have inadvertently discovered how to help the Soviet Union make a shambles of the one feature of the present-

day United Nations that otherwise could have done the most for him, for his country, and for his African friends.

The Soviet bid for the outright politicization of the Secretariat is a reminder that the Communist world is really incapable of relating itself to any international activity except on a political basis. Even in the days when the Secretariat was modest and routine to the extreme, Soviet and East European participation was both tentative and minimal. In contrast to the non-Communist world, the Soviet Union has never permitted the United Nations to recruit directly for the Secretariat. It has occasionally offered candidates embarrassingly unqualified, and it has generally recalled its citizens after no more than two or three years of service. Such observations as this, it might be added, lend support to the proposition that the Soviet Union has more reason to be afraid of participating in a vigorous United Nations than we should have of encouraging it.

Perhaps the last point sounds better than it is. Take the case of Mr. Kabigumila from Tanganyika, otherwise described as an indigenous inhabitant of the trust territory. Scholar Kabigumila was awarded a fellowship by the Soviet Union, but was refused permission to travel to Moscow—and thus prevented from taking up the fellowship by the British administering authorities. This act of denial flew in the face of a General Assembly resolution passed in the Fourteenth Session, and it deeply offended the Soviet Union. For after all, the Soviet Union was implementing the very wishes of the General Assembly by offering travelling fellowships to indigenous inhabitants of trust territories.

Now the precise reasons why the administering authorities refused Mr. Kabigumila permission to travel to Moscow remain obscure. But what would you have done? Is it necessary, in the interests of international cooperation, to help a man get the training that will be used to destroy you and all that you stand for?

All in all, it should be recognized that the seemingly never-ending parade of new and modest little entities being admitted to full and equal membership in the United Nations is not an unmixed blessing for the Soviet Union. These states emerge from most uneven preparations in colonial status,

and line up with the ever-extending front of the uncommitted. It is the uncommitted nations that will look to the United Nations for strength, that will insist on a vigorous world organization. Of course, the Communists, for many years to come, will still be able to lead them through the ritual chants against the wicked imperialists, just as the British Labour party can still get a chorus to lament the watering of the workers' beer. But the uncommitted nations will ultimately realize that they cannot live on anti-colonialism alone. At that point they will be faced with a choice: the abandonment of neutralism, or its continuation through a strong and effective United Nations. In either case, as the Soviet Union may know better than any of us, perhaps there are really not three worlds after all, but only two.

To what will all of this fresh and zestful voting strength be directed in the United Nations? Surely it will be to those issues which loom most prominently in the future plans of these uncommitted and underdeveloped nations: to the Expanded Technical Assistance Program, to the Special Fund, to the very things the Communist world has refused to support. And, not least, to the saving concept of the "United Nations presence:" the one idea in international life that can keep them uncommitted.

One should see not merely mischief when Khrushchev points with alarm to the down-trodden people of Oman. There may also be uneasiness; after Oman, what? And how to keep them all dancing, *ad infinitum*, in the halls of the General Assembly? We should not forget the shoe-banger, or fail to consider that among the complex promptings for that colorful episode may well have been

the bleakness of any other prospect for leadership and positive action by Communist powers in the United Nations. Khrushchev is never really angry at those he regards as imperialist lackeys. But in a United Nations increasingly looking to him for constructive leadership (what a terrible thought!), he must surely feel frustrated and uneasy.

Khrushchev closed the scene—indeed, the play—last year with an apologia, taking farewell of his audience by pleading:

I beg you not to be offended if I have said anything in a way I should not have done. I hurt the Philippine representative a little, and he hurt me. I am a young parliamentarian; he is an old hand. Let us learn from each other. . . . I wish you great success—and we can achieve success. . . . Gentles, do not reprehend. If you pardon, we will mend. . . . So, good night unto you all. Give me your hands, if we be friends, and Robin shall restore amends!

Isn't there something wrong with that quotation, someplace? Yes, sir. A great deal. More than even you think.

Ross N. Berkes, a Contributing Editor of *CURRENT HISTORY*, has had wide experience in international affairs. He spent the fall of 1958 in Washington on a special assignment for the United States Department of State, and has taught at the United States Naval Intelligence School in Washington, D.C. On sabbatical leave, 1955–1956, he studied British foreign policy at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. In 1945, he served on the staff of the Allied Secretariat, Four Power Control Council for Germany.

"... In a very real sense, the challenge of our age, the conflict we face today is a conflict between two forms of discipline. It is a competition between the type of discipline a free society must possess to remain free: the self-discipline that freemen and free nations choose to govern their lives and insure their progress versus the alternative, a ruthless, godless form of discipline imposed by external pressure, the discipline of force. . . . * * *

"Most importantly, those who view discipline as an irksome imposition, do not realize that our democratic system is based on discipline. They do not understand that a free government depends absolutely on disciplined individuals who freely adhere to a set of rules which prescribe the relationships within their own society."—Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, *U.S.N.*, July 11, 1961.

"The postwar civil defense program [in Russia] has been in effect over ten years and has been expanded and accelerated since 1955. It is neither a mere paper program nor a crash effort." This authority summarizes Russian plans for civil defense, emphasizing that "Soviet military leaders believe civil defense to be an integral part of the Soviet defense posture, contributing directly to the country's readiness for war."

Soviet Views on Civil Defense

By LEON GOURÉ

Social Science Department, The RAND Corporation

IN HIS address to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Marshal Zhukov warned of the existence of a "real threat from the air" and went on to say:

The task of defending the country's home front has never been so urgent as it is in the present circumstances. The security of the Soviet people demands further efforts to improve the organization of civil defense against air attacks and the proper training of the entire population. . . .¹

Since then, this view has been echoed by many of the leading marshals of the Soviet Union, all of whom have insisted that civil defense preparations are of "exceptionally great importance for strengthening the defense capability" of the Soviet Union.²

Leon Gouré* was born in Russia and has worked as a professional Soviet area specialist since 1949 first with the Library of Congress and for the past ten years as a Senior Staff Social Scientist with The RAND Corporation. He is a graduate of the School of International Affairs and Russian Institute of Columbia University and has a Ph.D. from Georgetown University, Washington, D. C. in political science. He coauthored a book, *Two Studies in Soviet Controls*, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1955, and has completed a book on *The Siege of Leningrad* and another on *Soviet Civil Defense* which will be published shortly.

Since until recently its leaders believed in the inevitability of war with the Western powers, the Soviet Union has had a long history of active civil defense preparation. After the Second World War, the development of new weapons and strategic means of delivery made the task faced by civil defense more complex and difficult. The growth of Soviet power reduced to some extent the likelihood of a new war and, together with the emergence of a number of Communist states, enabled Khrushchev to announce in 1956 that war was no longer "fatalistically inevitable"³ and to suggest that the Communist Bloc, instead of being encircled, was now encircling the Western powers.⁴ Khrushchev has boasted that the West "will hardly dare to launch a war against our Motherland or against the countries of socialism"⁵ since the West realizes what "colossal" forces are in the hands of the Communist Bloc. A Western attack on the Soviet Union is less likely, he has said, "not because the imperialists have become wiser and kinder, but because they have become weaker."⁶

Despite these claims of greater security

* The views expressed in this Paper are those of the author. They should not be taken as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of The RAND Corporation's governmental or private research sponsors.

¹ *Pravda*, February 20, 1956.

² *Voennye znaniia*, 1956, No. 8, p. 12; 1957, No. 1, p. 4. *Sovetskii patriot*, February 13, 1958.

³ *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.

⁴ *Pravda*, March 27, 1958.

⁵ *Pravda*, July 30, 1959.

⁶ *Pravda*, March 27, 1959.

for the Soviet Union, Soviet interest and activities in civil defense have not abated. "We negate the fatal inevitability of war," Khrushchev has said, "but of course no one can say categorically that there will be no war."⁷ The Soviet leaders have rejected the notion of a stable "balance of terror" which some people in the West hope will reduce the danger of war. This thesis, said a journal of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (C.P.S.U.), is an "effort to intimidate the working class with atomic weapons, to compel the proletariat to give up the struggle for power and for socialism."⁸ The proponents of this theory, said the article, are "frightened Philistines" who seek to "push the toilers along the path of capitulation to imperialism, allegedly in the interest of the 'self preservation' of socialism. . . ." Unwilling to rely completely on their ability in all circumstances to deter the West, or on the operation of a stable balance of deterrent forces, the Soviet leaders have continued to take seriously the possibility of war.

The Logic of War

According to Soviet military writers and political spokesmen, a future general war would be extremely destructive. Neither side would be restrained by moral considerations from employing all the weapons in its possession—nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological. Marshal Zhukov stated before the 20th Party Congress that:

A future war, if it is unleashed, will be characterized by the massive use of air forces, many types of missiles and various means of mass destruction such as atomic, thermonuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons.⁹

This view was echoed by Khrushchev when he warned that the use of such weapons

would be imposed by the inevitable "logic of war."¹⁰

Weapons of mass destruction are expected to be employed not only against military targets, but also against cities and civilian targets. According to a well-known Soviet military theoretician and propagandist, Major General N. Talensky, "It should be kept in mind that modern weapons, by their very nature, are designed primarily to strike industrial areas, administrative and political centers, and communication facilities."¹¹ This view has often been restated by Soviet military and political leaders. In 1960, for example, Khrushchev warned that in the event of a war all capitals, major industrial and administrative centers, and strategic areas would be attacked "in the first minutes of the war."¹²

According to Soviet military writers, the importance of civilian targets lies in the contribution which they may make to a country's war effort after the outbreak of the armed conflict and to the speed with which it might recover from the attack. While these writers recognize the destructiveness of modern weapons and the possibly devastating effects of a surprise attack, they do not exclude the possibility that a future war, waged between two large blocs, may be protracted. According to an article published early in 1961 in the journal of the political administration of the Soviet armed forces, a "new world war would be extremely intense and probably quite lengthy, for both coalitions possess immense human and material resources."¹³ Moreover, the forces and reserves in being at the start of the conflict are not expected to be sufficient for waging a long war.

. . . not one country under conditions of modern technology and the scale of a world war, is able, in time of peace, to produce supplies sufficient for the entire period of armed conflict, and military supply warehouses and supply bases are primary targets.¹⁴

In the event of a war, therefore, it becomes essential to ensure the survival of the administrative control and the industrial forces that may be expected to influence the further course of the war and possibly even determine its outcome.

Although Khrushchev has boasted that his "country is immense and the population

⁷ *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.

⁸ V. Platovskii, "The Marxist-Leninist Teaching on the Party and Contemporary Revisionism", *V. pomoshch politicheskomu samoobrazovaniu*, No. 6, June 1958.

⁹ *Pravda*, February 20, 1956.

¹⁰ *Pravda*, November 29, 1957.

¹¹ Major General N. Talensky, "The Soviet Disarmament Program and its Critics", *International Affairs*, 1959, No. 11, p. 8.

¹² *Pravda*, January 15, 1960.

¹³ V. Uzenyev, "The Economic and Sociopolitical Basis of the Military Power of States", *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, 1961 No. 6 p. 51.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

is less concentrated in major industrial centers than in many other countries,"¹⁵ the vulnerability of the Soviet Union to attack has been greatly increased as a result of growing urbanization. According to the 1959 census, of the 212 million inhabitants of the Soviet Union, 49 per cent live in cities and 70 per cent in European Russia. Half of the urban population is concentrated in 155 major administrative and industrial cities.¹⁶

Vulnerability

Since the aim of the Soviet Union in war is not only to destroy the enemy, but also to survive his attacks, civil defense measures in areas of urban concentration can make a direct contribution to Soviet war-waging capability. An article on Soviet military science and doctrine put it this way:

The role of the rear [home front] has grown enormously in present-day wars and continues to grow. If the rear acquired a decisive role even during the First, and especially in the Second World War, then the course and outcome of a future war will depend to an even greater degree on the rear, victory being impossible without a highly organized rear in a country morally strong and economically and technologically powerful. This is why, from the very beginning of a future war, both sides will aim at destroying the operations and paralyzing the rear of the opponent and on the other hand will try to organize a reliable anti-air, anti-airborne, anti-atomic, anti-chemical and anti-bacteriological protection and defense of the rear.¹⁷

Soviet military leaders believe civil defense to be an integral part of the Soviet defense posture, contributing directly to the country's readiness for war. The noted Soviet military theoretician, Major General G. I. Pokrovsky, listed civil defense in second place among a number of factors which he said formed "one system" in Soviet military science.¹⁸

Since civil defense is viewed as part of over-all defense capability, it has a role in deterring an opponent's attack. Since civil

defense precautions make it seem more probable that the Soviet Union might, if it had much to gain, risk retaliatory damage by launching a nuclear attack, the Soviet leaders appear to value civil defense as lending credibility to the indirect threats which they may use for political ends. Down to the present, the Soviet leaders have not referred to the Soviet civil defense capability in support of their claims or threats; this does not preclude them from doing so in the future. The internationally known Soviet physicist, P. Kapitsa, has pointed out:

In the struggle for the prevention of atomic war, it is essential to take into account the possibility that there will be found a reliable defense against nuclear weapons. If this is achieved by a country with aggressive intentions, then, being itself protected against the direct effects of nuclear weapons, it can much more easily decide to launch an atomic war.¹⁹

Such a defense could include passive as well as active measures, or civil defense as well as fighting forces. A country possessing such means would be in a position, according to Kapitsa, to "impose its will on others." Soviet handbooks state the case for civil defense quite simply: "The possession of atomic, chemical, and bacteriological weapons by the imperialists and the threat of their use forces us actively to prepare for civil defense."²⁰

Survival and Recuperation

The postwar civil defense program has been in effect over ten years and has been expanded and accelerated since 1955. It is neither a mere paper program nor a crash effort. It tries within budgetary and technical limits to improve progressively Moscow's ability to protect the Soviet population and economy against the effects of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons. The purpose of Soviet civil defense is not only to assure the physical survival of a substantial element of the population, especially Party members, the armed forces, administrative personnel, and industrial workers, but also to preserve civilian morale and attempt to provide for the rapid recuperation of the country from attack.

In order to meet these requirements, Soviet civil defense plans include a nationwide shelter construction program, the

¹⁵ *Pravda*, January 15, 1960.

¹⁶ *Izvestia*, May 10, 1959.

¹⁷ Col. I. S. Baz, "Soviet Military Science on the Character of Contemporary War," *Voennye vestnik*, 1958, No. 6, pp. 24-25.

¹⁸ Major General G. I. Pokrovsky, *Rol nauki i tekhniki v sovremennoi voine*, Znanic, Moscow 1957, p. 22.

¹⁹ P. Kapitsa, "The Task of Entire Progressive Mankind," *Novoe vremia* 1956, No. 39, p. 10.

²⁰ I. P. Miroshnikov and G. N. Zapolskii, *Zashchita naseleniia ot sovremennykh sredstv porazheniia*, DOSAAF, Moscow, 1959, p. 3.

maintenance of a large trained civil defense organization, compulsory training of the population, provision for the evacuation of cities, and preparations to provide large-scale assistance to the disaster areas. The Soviet authorities have not published any official figures on their civil defense budget, many parts of which are hidden in the budgets of other agencies and local administrations. Nevertheless, it has been possible to estimate the probable range of Soviet expenditures on civil defense through careful assessments of the apparent scope of the Soviet effort. According to a recent statement made by Mr. Ellis, Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, the Soviet Union is believed to be spending annually not less than \$500 million and possibly as much as \$1,500 million on civil defense.²¹ In view of the progressive expansion of the program, it is likely that these expenditures have tended to increase over the years.

The Soviet civil defense organization consists of a variety of permanent staffs and of large numbers of services and units, manned by part-time trained workers, which operate at all levels from the central government down to cities, factories, apartment houses, and farms. According to a statement by Khrushchev, the civil defense organization includes at least 22 million trained persons.²² This force will be supplemented by special rural formations, military units, and mobilized trained citizens who will come to the assistance of disaster areas.

The Soviet shelter program, which has been in effect for over ten years, emphasizes public shelters rather than private or family shelters. It requires the peacetime construction in the cities of a variety of permanent shelters which will be supplemented especially in rural areas by emergency fallout shelters when the Soviet government believes there is a real danger of war. There are even plans afoot to build fallout shelters for cattle. The permanent shelters vary in size and resistance to blast. They include a limited number of very deep and heavy

shelters designed to withstand more than 300 pounds per square inch (p.s.i.) of blast pressure, subways which are believed to be equipped with concealed blast doors at the entrances to the lower station platforms, detached shelters designed for 100 to 150 p.s.i. which may each accommodate up to several thousand persons, and basement shelters in public buildings and apartment houses which can withstand blast up to about 100 p.s.i.²³ All permanent shelters are equipped for long-term occupancy and provide a high degree of protection against radiation, fire, and collapsing buildings, as well as against chemical and bacteriological weapons. It has been estimated that the Moscow subway system alone could now shelter from one to two million people, or from 20 per cent to 40 per cent of the city's population.²⁴

In 1955, the Soviet authorities introduced a compulsory training program for men of 16 to 60 years and women of 16 to 55. Since that time, four successive training courses have been instituted which by 1962 will have provided a total of 64 hours of training, half of it devoted to practical work and exercises. Children 12 to 16 also receive training in school.

The Soviet leaders believe that this training will reduce the degree of trauma and panic which the population might suffer in the event of an attack, that it will prevent many casualties and teach the population self-help, and that it will provide masses of trained civilians to assist the civil defense organization in dealing with the effects of an attack. For this reason, as we have noted, Soviet military leaders insist that the training program serves to strengthen the military defense capability of the Soviet Union. In pursuit of this goal, the courses acquaint the population with the effects of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons; teach them how to use gas masks and protective clothing and how to behave in response to different warning signals; instruct them in first aid, firefighting, and decontamination procedures; familiarize them with the use of radiation and chemical detection instruments; and show the country people how to protect food and water and give veterinary assistance to cattle.

²¹ *New York Times*, May 17, 1961.

²² Leon Gouré, "What's Russia Doing About Civil Defense?" *Air Force and Space Digest*, August 1961, p. 40.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.* p. 41.

It is probable that from 50 to 100 million persons have passed through one or more of these courses. The annual cost of the latest training course has been estimated at \$100 to \$200 million. There is considerable emphasis in the training on measures to protect individuals against the effects of chemical and bacteriological warfare, including not only the wearing of gas masks and protective clothing, but also the use of atropine syrette and other antidotes against war gases.²⁵

The Soviet city planners are attempting to reduce the density of the population in the large cities by increasing the area of open spaces and parks in new districts and by the construction of very broad streets which may act as firebreaks. They are also trying to limit the growth of major urban centers and to build satellite towns around them at a distance of 35 to 50 miles. In addition, since 1958, there have been plans to evacuate a substantial proportion of the urban population, first to initial staging areas 10 to 50 miles outside the cities and later, if time permits, to permanent locations in rural areas.

The available evidence leaves no doubt that the Soviet authorities are serious about civil defense and that they have invested considerable financial and material resources in an attempt to achieve a significant civil defense capability. The exact extent of Soviet achievements in this field is not known, since no official figures have been published on the present Soviet shelter capability or on the number of persons who have completed their training. Secrecy has extended to the point where it is a policy not to mark the location of existing shelters by signs until there is a danger of war, although people are shown the shelters nearest to their place of work and residence as a part of the training program. Despite these uncertainties, the available evidence indicates that the Soviet Union has achieved a considerable shelter capacity which is sufficient at present for a substantial part of the residents of larger cities.

At the same time, the character of the program has tended to some extent to lag behind developments in weapon technology, and it is also evident that the Soviet leaders have been unwilling or unable to invest in a

civil defense system which would be effective against the entire range of possible attacks. The effectiveness of the system, indeed, is largely dependent on the receipt of adequate advance warning of an attack. This reliance on early strategic warning is indicated by the existence of a civil defense warning signal, the "threatening situation" alert, which is to be announced by the Government when it believes war to be imminent or when it has information about a possible enemy attack. Only when this warning is sounded will gas masks be distributed to the population, urban residents evacuated, emergency fallout shelters built, and other preparations made.

This plan does not mean that the Soviet leaders have not considered other forms of war initiation or that the program is intended merely to reassure the population. Nor does it indicate a lack of coordination between the thinking of the civil defense and military authorities. The program is far too costly merely to serve the purpose of boosting morale. The available evidence suggests that the program has neither alarmed nor noticeably reassured the population.

The Soviet military and political leaders have recognized that a surprise nuclear blow could constitute the most dangerous form of attack which the Soviet Union might have to face, but at the same time they have given indications that they also believe in the possibility of receiving early warning of enemy intentions. They appear to think that the growth of Soviet military retaliatory power has greatly reduced the danger of an unprovoked surprise attack on the Soviet Union. Consequently, though the Soviet civil defense system is designed to perform most effectively within a limited and relatively favorable range of circumstances, the Soviet leaders consider the likelihood of their occurrence sufficient to justify the program.

It is difficult to predict the future course of the Soviet activities in civil defense. Since constant efforts are made to expand the system and improve its performance, it may in time become less dependent on early warning. It is significant, however, despite the increasing destructiveness of modern weapons and the inevitable limitations which it imposes on the effectiveness of civil defense, that the Soviet leaders believe the program merits further investment of time and money.

²⁵ *Uchebno-metodicheskoe posobie po provedeniiu trenirovok i priemu norm "Gotov k PVO" 1-i stupeni. (Training and Methodological Handbook for Training and Passing the Norm "Ready for Anti-Air Defense" 1st grade).* DOSAAF, Moscow, 1959, p. 74.

"In the epoch of cold war, the fine art of the diplomacy of 'disarmament' has assumed a standardized pattern which all 'negotiators,' sometimes unwittingly, have followed with undeviating fidelity," observes this author. "The objective, needless to say, is never 'disarmament.'"

The Impasse of Disarmament

By FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

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WINSTON CHURCHILL told Commons on October 1, 1939, in oft-quoted words, that Soviet foreign policy was "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." "But," he added in a passage seldom quoted, "perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest." If we may paraphrase the master phrase-maker, we may well say of the problem of disarmament that it constitutes a deadlock embedded in a dilemma within an illusion.

If there is any way out of this blind alley (apart from some such miracle as universal acceptance of pacifism or "neutralism"), its route, as Federalists know, follows a path from a negotiated *modus vivendi* between East and West toward a new Concert of Power as a restoration of the major premise of the United Nations Charter so that progress can be made toward world law under world government. Rational observers of the recurrent tragedies of the twentieth century must conclude, if they

study the record and weigh the evidence, that this is the only viable alternative to continued world anarchy and more world war—which is now the road to world ruin and the co-annihilation of most of mankind.

Unhappily the alternative is, after all, not "viable." Soviet and American policy-makers are not Federalists. Both prefer to cling to the ancient and now obsolete assumption that armaments in being and, *in extremis*, military violence in action are means to national security and operationally workable ways of attaining national objectives and "solving" international disputes. Since all human experience for more than half a century denies and refutes the assumption, large numbers of troubled people have long since concluded that salvation might be found in efforts by the Great Powers to negotiate a reduction, limitation, or abolition of national armaments.

The motivations of this endeavor, its contemporary *modus operandi* as a technique of policy and a vehicle of deception and self-deception, and its utter futility as a means of reaching its alleged goal have nothing to do, save semantically, with the ideologies of communism and anti-communism and little to do with differences of political and economic structures between the two Super-Powers. Popular and official clichés in the U.S.S.R. attribute frustration to the "aggressive designs" of bourgeois "imperialists" and "militarists." Prevailing stereotypes in the United States blame failure on Soviet plans for "world conquest" and Soviet refusal to accept international inspection and control. Both explanations—like the flowers that bloom in the spring, tra-la!—have

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nothing to do with the case, save as convenient rationalizations of altogether different purposes in the minds of policy-makers. The purposes are concealed and often repressed into the unconscious. The rationalizations are cheerfully accepted by gullible publics eager and anxious to engage in tribal self-adoration and impassioned denunciation of wickedness abroad.

The Politics of Power

The essence of the matter is simple, albeit never officially acknowledged and universally misunderstood except by a handful of dissenting commentators. The essence merits restatement, since those who fail to grasp it can make no sense of Soviet (or of American or any other) proposals for "disarmament." All politics under anarchy is "power politics"—i.e., the pursuit of "security" and of other purposes by coercion, "defensive" or "aggressive" as the case may be. In the absence of enforceable law under effective government, violence is always the *ultima ratio regis*. The Western State System, now as always, lacks effective government and enforceable law, even in an interdependent global civilization which is desperately in need of both. Its sovereign rulers and patriotic peoples are unwilling to accept either, although the self-evident price of refusal now threatens to be the decline and fall of Western culture and the possible self-extinction of a misnamed *Homo Sapiens*.

Given the persistence into the thermonuclear age of habit-patterns as old as Original Sin, power politics remains a business (never more so than in 1961) of threats of force and use of force as prime means of serving national purposes, to the tune of a gigantic rivalry in the accumulation of weapons. In *The Great Illusion*, first published in 1910, Norman Angell warned that under modern conditions "military power is socially and economically futile. . . . War, even when victorious, can no longer achieve those aims for which people strive." The book sold millions of copies in many languages and won for its author a knighthood and a Nobel Peace Prize. It effected no change whatever in the illusions of national policy-makers and publics. Two world wars ensued. Their results brilliantly and tragically vindi-

cated Sir Norman's thesis, but again produced no departures from time-honored attitudes and values.

The Psychology of Suspicion

Within this context, national decision-makers, reluctantly driven by popular fears of disaster and resentments at military burdens, have long gone through the motions of negotiating "disarmament." Such gestures have almost always been foredoomed. Not by chance did the first initiatives (and the most recent initiatives) come from Russia. The Muscovites through a thousand years, and particularly in the present century, have suffered more grievously than any other modern people from man's age-old addiction to war. The Ministers of Tsar Nicholas II, dimly sensing things to come, invited the Powers to the First (1899) and Second (1907) Hague Peace Conferences in hopes of ending the arms race. Both conferences codified, paradoxically, certain rules of the "international law of war," but arrived at no agreements of any kind to promote disarmament. The outcome was identical in all subsequent efforts, including those under the auspices of the League of Nations between world wars and those under the auspices of the United Nations since World War II.

Only once thus far since the turn of the century have the Great Powers arrived at a voluntary accord (albeit transitory) to reduce arms. At the Washington Conference, called on American initiative, the United States, Britain, and Japan agreed by terms of the Five-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, to scrap sundry war vessels and restrict battleship tonnage to a 5-5-3 ratio, with France and Italy later accepting a ratio of 1.67 each. This result was a reflection of a stable balance of power, seldom attained before or since and unlikely to be repeated. The naval Powers of the early 1920's were not affected with ideological fanaticism. Their economies, moreover, were not dependent upon the armament industries. In the light of current sub-illusions of the Great Illusion, it is worth recalling that the accord of 1922 did not provide for the abolition, but only for the reduction and limitation, of armaments and made no provision whatever for "international control and inspection."

The negotiators assumed mutual trust, based on reciprocal advantage. For a brief time the assumption proved valid.

This assumption has never since prevailed in the relationships among the Powers. In its absence, disarmament by agreement is a psychological and political impossibility. Prime Minister Clement Attlee asserted, correctly, in Commons, November 22, 1945: "Where there is no mutual confidence, no system will be effective." Said Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 19, 1957: "We cannot trust the Russians on this or anything."

In the epoch of cold war, the fine art of the diplomacy of "disarmament" has assumed a standardized pattern which all "negotiators," sometimes unwittingly, have followed with undeviating fidelity. The objective, needless to say, is never "disarmament." The end, always, is to prevent any cessation of the arms race, unless it can be mitigated on terms which will enhance "my" power and reduce "your" power, and to create a public impression that responsibility for failure is attributable to the perversity of others. The means to the end are to offer "proposals" which are known in advance to be unacceptable but which, when rejected, may foster an image of "our" rectitude and "their" sinfulness. Moscow and Washington alike have long persisted assiduously in what Charles O. Lerche, Jr. has aptly called "the diplomacy of embarrassment."¹ In the practice of this subtle skill, Russian policy-makers, thus far, have done rather better than American policy-makers, although both must be given credit for ingenuity.

Muscovite Magic

Space is lacking for a complete review of Soviet projects for disarmament,² nor would such a survey be meaningful if no common denominator could be discovered. Fortunately, a persisting theme is discernible, long antedating the era of Khrushchev. The formula is deceptively simple, enormously appealing to all naive seekers after peace, forever unacceptable to the Western Powers,

and therefore embarrassing to the "bourgeoisie." Its variations and permutations are multitudinous. Its *leitmotif* is clear as a bell: all nations should agree to the immediate and total abolition of all armaments. Peace will then be assured, since no State will possess the means of waging war. Q.E.D.

Unlike Minerva from the brow of Jove, this prescription did not emerge at once and full grown from the October Revolution of 1917. Lenin resolved his early ambivalences toward disarmament with the revolutionary recipe: "Convert the imperialist war into civil war!" Chicherin at Genoa in April, 1922, proposed (with no response) a general limitation of armaments and the outlawry of poison gas, aerial warfare, and the terrorization of civilian populations. In December, 1922, Moscow proposed to the Baltic States (again without result) an accord to reduce armies by 75 per cent within 18 to 24 months, to disband irregular military formations, to cut naval forces, and to limit arms expenditures. Not for another five years did the formula flow forth from the fertile brain of wily Maxim Litvinov. On November 30, 1927, at the fourth session of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, he presented a detailed, 14-point program for "immediate, complete, and general disarmament" to be achieved within a year by agreement to abolish all armed forces, scrap all weapons, put an end to military service, disband all General Staffs, discard all defense budgets, and so on.

As Litvinov anticipated, this suggestion that "the way to disarm is to disarm" was supported by the German and Turkish delegations (also "pariahs" in 1927), but was bitterly condemned as outrageous and preposterous by Western spokesmen and finally rejected in March, 1928. Litvinov then proposed partial and gradual disarmament. This and all his later pleas fell on deaf ears. Equally talented as a prophet and a propagandist, he commented: "May those who believe they have indefinite time at their disposal not receive a rude shock one day."

The Kremlin persisted in its formula as long as it seemed plausible and reverted to it after the holocaust of World War II. In June of 1946, Andrei Gromyko proposed

¹ *Foreign Policy of the American People*, Prentice-Hall, 2nd Edition, 1961, p. 370.

² See Carol L. Thompson, "A History of Disarmament Proposals," *Current History*, January, 1959.

an international ban on atomic weapons, a cessation of their production, the destruction of all stockpiles within three months, and severe penalties for violators. Stalin adhered to this posture even after the U.S.S.R. in 1949 broke the United States atomic monopoly and coupled it with repeated proposals for a one-third cut in conventional forces. His successors pushed the campaign with renewed vigor and persuasive variants. On May 10, 1955, Jacob Malik suggested a "freeze" of conventional forces as of December 31, 1954, and a two-stage program for control and inspection of general disarmament. In 1956, and repeatedly thereafter, Moscow once more urged a ban on nuclear weapons plus a reduction of conventional forces to 1,500,000 men for the U.S.S.R., the United States, and China, 650,000 for France and Britain, and a limit of 200,000 for all others. On September 18, 1959, Premier Khrushchev at the United Nations returned *in toto* to the Litvinov gambit of 1927 by proposing "total disarmament" within a four-year period, involving the complete elimination of all armed forces, weapons, General Staffs, foreign bases, and so on.

All Soviet proposals for "disarmament" (with one exception to be noted below) were known in advance by the Muscovite policy-makers to be unacceptable to the West. All have been put forward to embarrass the United States. All have been made public, thus making any genuine negotiation impossible; for diplomacy can never be conducted in public but only in private. All have been neatly calculated, in the wildly improbable event of acceptance, to strengthen the Communist bloc and weaken the "Free World." Total disarmament, if ever attained in a State System still committed to the politics of power, would make national power a function of fists, clubs and brick-bats. In such a mythical world the United States would rank a poor fourth in "power" after China, India and the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev's most effective move in this game of propaganda and pretense has been his challenge, often reiterated since 1959, to accept *any* system of inspection and con-

trol the West may propose on condition of Western assent to total disarmament. This "bluff" effectively demolishes the American case in the eyes of "neutralists" and many others elsewhere and is entirely "safe." Mr. K. and his comrades do not believe in miracles. They know full well that Washington will never agree to total disarmament—and, in all probability, will never agree to any disarmament at all.

American Response

Since the United States is a democracy and not a totalitarian oligarchy like the U.S.S.R., its policy-makers have been unable to achieve a comparable degree of consistency, clarity and plausibility in the game of pretense and propaganda called "disarmament negotiations." They have nevertheless succeeded during a decade and a half in avoiding any proposals which might conceivably be acceptable to Moscow and in publicizing a variety of quasi-credible formulas which have perhaps won friends and influenced people in the absence of general knowledge of their purposes. This record is not our present concern. A few highlights may yet be usefully noted.

The tale begins with Bernard Baruch's proposal of June, 1946, for international control of atomic energy. Whether Moscow would ever have accepted the Lilienthal-Acheson Plan of March, 1946, for a global U.N. Atomic Development Authority³ to own and operate all atomic facilities everywhere in the interests of peace, none of us can ever know. Baruch, with the full endorsement of President Truman, coupled this creative idea with a stipulation designed to guarantee Soviet rejection to the end of prolonging indefinitely the American atomic monopoly. The stipulation was a demand for abolition of the "veto" in the Security Council in atomic matters so that "violators" might be subjected to "condign punishment" by majority vote.

This formula, with variations, has persisted ever since for comparable purposes and with comparable results. In recent years the American position has been reduced to one of relative simplicity: no accord to restrict, limit, or abolish weapons is possible without a 100 per cent "fool-proof" system of international inspection

³ Cf. "A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy," Dept. of State Document 2498, 1946.

and control. Soviet rejection of this formula for institutionalized distrust has long been depicted by American politicians and publicists as evidence of American virtue and Communist vice. The portrait is all but unanimously accepted as valid throughout the United States, but lacks plausibility elsewhere. The men of Moscow, as noted above, are pledged to effective international inspection and control, albeit on a condition wholly unacceptable to the United States. More significantly, the will-o-the-wisp of inspection and control has long since been rendered obsolete by the ever-accelerating scientific and technological revolution. Secret underground missile bases and mobile carriers of missiles make "inspection and control" all but impossible. Atomic-powered submarines, ranging the ocean floors of the earth with weapons capable of annihilating millions of civilians thousands of miles away, admit of no "inspection and control" whatever.

But much of mankind is slow in grasping these new facts of life—and of death. Therefore Washington policy-makers have persisted in their formula. All American proposals for "disarmament" were known in advance to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union. All have been put forward to embarrass the U.S.S.R. All have been made public, thus making any genuine negotiation impossible. All have been carefully calculated, in the wholly improbable event of acceptance, to strengthen the "Free World" and to weaken the Communist bloc.

President Eisenhower at the Geneva Summit of July, 1955, proposed "open skies" at a time when Russian memories of the horrors of World War II still forbade the publication in any city of the U.S.S.R. of street maps, guide-books, and even telephone directories. Rejection was thus assured—with the C.I.A., as revealed in May, 1960, authorized to violate Soviet air space following Soviet refusal to consent to American aerial espionage. In subsequent "negotiations" every Soviet assent to United States proposals for "inspection and control" was countered by new United States proposals for *more* "inspection and control." Thus, when the U.S.S.R. at Geneva in 1959 accepted American proposals for checking on atomic explosions, United States experts,

with typical Yankee inventiveness, discovered that secret underground detonations could not be detected after all by the procedures they had proposed and that far more elaborate, intricate, and inquisitive methods would be needed before any accord could be reached.

Cast Accounts

Who has "won," or who is "winning," this contest in reciprocal deceit and misrepresentation? The imponderables in the equation preclude any definitive answer. Moscow scored a *coup* in announcing in March, 1958, a unilateral suspension of nuclear testing. Washington reluctantly followed suit in October. Subsequent talks at Geneva for a permanent test-ban were soon deadlocked. Early in 1960 a special ten-member group, five from each bloc, began parallel "negotiations" in Geneva on the broader problem of disarmament, hoping for guidance from the projected Summit Conference in Paris in May—which never met because of the U-2 incident and Eisenhower's refusal to "apologize" for a flagrant violation of international law. During the American political campaign of 1960 both candidates, while championing the "world rule of law," outdid one another in urging further violations of law for the purpose of overthrowing Cuba's Castro. This bipartisan resolve eventuated in the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961. During the summer of 1961 the Kennedy administration embarked upon a massive increase of armaments (inevitably matched by the U.S.S.R.) in the name of the synthetic Berlin "war crisis," thus yielding control of American policy to the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the C.I.A., and those elements in the State Department and other agencies committed to the Great Illusion—with unanimous approval by Congress and all-but-unanimous public support in a new "war psychosis."

Under these circumstances, negotiations at Geneva for a permanent nuclear test-ban withered on the vine, while the ten-nation disarmament conference got nowhere and suspended its sessions. A published note of the United States to the U.S.S.R., July 15, 1961, accused Moscow of "sabotage." By mid-summer all talks about "disarmament"

had been suspended, with American policy-makers continuing to insist on "fool-proof" schemes of inspection and control while Soviet policy-makers continued to insist on "total disarmament," a merging of the test-ban problem with general disarmament, and a "troika" or "veto" arrangement for the administration of controls. Each side professed its "sincerity," all the while knowing that all of its suggestions were, by design, unacceptable to the other.

By the time these words appear in print, it will be clear to all who are aware and informed, despite official pretenses to the contrary, that all the long drawn-out "diplomacy of disarmament" has been a fraud and a hoax on both sides. In appealing to the two-thirds of mankind which wants none of the "cold war" and pronounces a plague on both houses, Moscow has scored more points than Washington. The reason is obvious. Washington's projected image of Moscow as a citadel of tyranny, oppression, aggression, and "world conquest" is not credible to uncommitted peoples and governments. Moscow's projected image of Washington as the seat of a decadent and grasping capitalism, dependent for employment, production, and stock market profits on "war scares" and arms spending, is far more credible. So long as the decision-makers of America persist in the course of their "crusade against communism" in acting precisely as Communists predict they will act, America's "world mission" will fail of its purpose and the American future will remain dubious.

Dark Horizon

A wholly different approach to the problem of mankind's escape from thermonuclear destruction is possible, but not probable. This approach was outlined by Prime Minister Anthony Eden at the Geneva Summit of July, 1955. He urged negotiations toward the goal of German reunification on the basis of neutralization, demilitarization, denuclearization, and disengagement. His proposals were elaborated by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in his several "plans" of 1957-1958 and ultimately endorsed by Khrushchev and his colleagues. They were, in fact, the source of Premier Khrushchev's initial proposals of November, 1958, for converting West Berlin into a demilitarized and

neutralized "Free City" under U.N. administration, although few readers of the American press would ever guess at the connection.

This orientation offers hope for the future and has already borne fruit in the recent past. On the Continent, Yugoslavia has been "neutralized" since 1948 by Stalin's folly; Finland has been semi-neutralized by Moscow's wisdom; and Sweden and Switzerland are "neutralists" by choice. Two East-West treaties, signed, ratified, and faithfully observed by all parties, have been based on the same formula. The first was the Austrian treaty of May 15, 1955, restoring Austrian sovereignty and providing for disengagement and withdrawal of occupation forces on condition of non-alignment. The second was the Twelve-Power Treaty of December, 1959 (ratified during 1960 by both the United States and the U.S.S.R.), providing for the neutralization, demilitarization and denuclearization of Antarctica. A comparable treaty on Outer Space and other accords for the extension of these principles to Central Europe, Eastern Asia, the Middle East, and Africa may yet save mankind from the prospectively fatal consequences of its continued devotion to the assumption of violence in international affairs. No other approach offers any present prospect of limiting the arms race.

This approach has the full support of the policy-makers of the Soviet Union—whose motivations, in this instance at least, do not flow from the calculations customary in such matters but rest upon concern for survival. This approach has long been vigorously denounced and sternly rejected by policy-makers in Bonn and Washington, followed reluctantly by their confreres in London, Paris, Rome and Tokyo, all on the false assumptions still implicit in the Great Illusion. So long as this remains the case, mankind has no reason for good cheer regarding its probable destiny. An indefinite perpetuation of the arms race and the Cold War means inevitably, as Sir Charles P. Snow contended in New York in December, 1960, a steady expansion of the thermonuclear suicide club and a certainty that within a decade some of the bombs will go off.

Meanwhile, policy-makers and publicists, particularly in the United States, would do

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Warning that "... the struggle against encroaching Soviet power will continue for decades, barring the possibility of nuclear catastrophe," this specialist believes that "The West can ... affect the long-run orientation of Soviet policy by pushing the political, economic, and military integration of the Western world."

The Problem of Coexistence

By ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

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IN 1871, the Russian philosopher and noted Slavophile, Danilevsky, forecast a clash between Russia and the West for supremacy in Europe. He held that Russian civilization, being more dynamic and progressive, would overwhelm Western civilization and emerge to universal preeminence. If one substitutes the word "Soviet" for "Russian," then Danilevsky's prognostication assumes a particular relevance.

Ninety years later, two hostile worlds confront each other along the Oder-Neisse, and in the city of Berlin. The two compete and clash in all areas of the world: in the Congo, Cuba and Laos, but the storm clouds are particularly ominous in Berlin. The Soviet Union and the West struggle for power, prestige and position throughout the globe, with the spectre of nuclear war always in the background. It is highly unlikely that either would risk thermonuclear war for control of any of the marginal regions currently in the limelight. But Berlin could become the Sarajevo of World War III. It is in Europe that the "Cold War" could reach a nuclear climax.

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For the next generation, only Europe can upset the precarious, and shifting, balance of world power. Should the Russians triumph in Europe, they would not only acquire an industrial-technological base that would assure them military supremacy, but, perhaps as important, they would have dealt an irreparable blow to the West's "ideological concepts"—concern for individual liberty, rule by law, and government responsive to the needs of its people. It is a paradox of contemporary international relations that nationalism in the underdeveloped areas is permeated with strong strands of anti-Westernism, yet the fundamentals of this nationalism are rooted in Western concepts and values.

Khrushchev's objectives in Europe are the same as Stalin's: to preserve the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe; to undermine Nato and bring about a withdrawal of American power from the continent; to retard West German rearmament and integration into the Western alliance; and to hinder and oppose all moves designed to promote Western unity. Ironically, attainment of these Soviet objectives is most jeopardized by Khrushchev's deliberate provocations in Berlin. For nothing reinforces Western resolve so much as Soviet pressure in Europe. When the chill wind blows from Moscow, the Western nations draw closer together, out of a desire for enhanced security and a greater appreciation of the ties which unite them.

To Khrushchev, Soviet security and Soviet supremacy are indivisible. As a Communist, he believes that capitalism is doomed

historically, and that communism (Soviet-style and Soviet-dominated) is inevitable. As the High Priest of the Russian state, he seeks to extend Russian influence by all means short of nuclear war—an eventuality repugnant to any rational, responsible leader.¹

Peaceful Coexistence: Illusion or Ideal?

Prior to 1945, a weak, isolated Soviet Union used the policy of "peaceful coexistence" to buttress its essentially defensive strategy. It was a policy dictated by weakness. Since the late 1940's, and particularly since the acquisition of a thermonuclear capability in 1953 and a missile advantage in 1957, the cut of peaceful coexistence has become tailored to an offensive strategy. Peaceful coexistence now is designed to promote dissension in the West (over Soviet objectives and the means to thwart them), and to intrude Soviet influence in underdeveloped areas and capture nationalist movements there.

Whereas Stalin made the Soviet Union into a great power that threatened the West primarily in Europe, Khrushchev has developed a global policy which challenges the West in all areas of the world. For Khrushchev, peaceful coexistence is one aspect of a broader policy of divide and conquer.

Attempts to understand contemporary Soviet foreign policy frequently founder on misconceptions concerning the Soviet meaning of "peaceful coexistence." To the West, the term signifies a situation in which the status quo in the international arena is maintained, with any changes taking place gradually and in accordance with carefully worked out agreements; to the Soviets, on the other hand, it implies a strategy of conflict, short of nuclear war, in which the Communist camp is strengthened and expanded to encompass new countries. Peace with the capitalist world, that is to say, a permanent settlement of political issues, is a concept alien to current Kremlin leaders.

If this interpretation is valid, how, then, is one to evaluate Khrushchev's reiterations

that coexistence is essential to prevent war? For example, in a speech to the Austrian-Soviet Society in July, 1960, he declared:

I have said many times in my speeches that it is necessary to insure peaceful coexistence, irrespective of the basis—capitalist or socialist—on which the statehood of this or that people is built. In our time the capitalist and socialist countries must coexist in order to prevent war, so that all disputes are settled peacefully, through discussion and not through war.

Again, in his speech before the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 1960, he stated that:

... we do not want to impose our order by force upon other countries. Let those who determine the policy of states with a social order differing from ours also renounce futile and dangerous attempts at dictating their will. It is time for them also to recognize that the choice of one way of life or another is a domestic matter for each people. Let us build up our relations, taking into consideration the hard facts of reality. And this will be peaceful coexistence.

This is Khrushchev talking to the non-Communist world, calling for negotiation, and sedulously holding out the promise of accommodation and compromise. But the olive branch has thorns. In addressing members of the Communist world, he offers a different picture of coexistence. Thus, in a major speech on the result of the November, 1960, conference of 81 Communist parties, delivered in Moscow on January 6, 1961, Khrushchev declared that:


The policy of peaceful coexistence, as regards its social content, is a form of intense economic, political, and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international arena.

For the Russians, coexistence does not preclude struggle and strife; it is an affirmation of the Soviet belief that through ideological, economic and cultural war, capitalism (the West) can be brought to its knees.

Even more instructive is the concept of "peaceful coexistence" contained in the draft program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This draft program, published on July 30, 1961, was presented to the Twenty-second Congress of the C.P.S.U., which convened in Moscow in October.² The first Party program published since 1919, it bears the unmistakable imprint of

¹ We make the assumption that Soviet leaders are not Hitlerian personalities bent on world conquest at all costs and within a set timetable; if we do not, there is little to discuss.

² For excerpts see pages 299 ff. of this issue.



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Nikita Khrushchev. It establishes him as a leading theoretician in the tradition of Marx and Lenin (Stalin is not mentioned anywhere in the 50,000 word statement).

Acknowledging that "war cannot and must not serve as a means of settling international disputes," the Party program implies that peaceful coexistence offers an acceptable alternative. Any other way would lead to thermonuclear war, which, by implication, would "sweep imperialism away and bury it," while leaving the Communist world damaged but intact. But then the Party draft program offers its view of how a policy of "peaceful coexistence" would enable the Communist world to defeat the West.

Peaceful coexistence serves as a basis for the peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism on an international scale and constitutes a specific form of class struggle between them. As they consistently pursue the policy of peaceful coexistence, the Socialist countries are steadily strengthening the positions of the world Socialist system in its competition with capitalism.

Peaceful coexistence affords more favorable opportunities for the struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries and facilitates the struggle of the people of the colonial and dependent countries for their liberation.

The struggle against the West is to be pressed by any means short of all-out war. "Imperialist" wars will be resisted, just as all national liberation movements seeking to gain their independence from Western domination will be aided. Throughout the draft program there is the firm belief that the balance of world power is shifting toward the Communist camp, and that capitalism (the West and its allies) is rapidly losing its capacity for upsetting the inevitability of communism. This is the credo of an increasingly confident, powerful Soviet Union. Coexistence is possible; indeed, it is likely to continue in its present form throughout the 1960's. But increasingly it will be the Soviet Union which decides the degree of conflict, the areas of competition, and the moments of relaxation. The current international crises are not due entirely to Soviet pressure, but there is no doubt that Soviet pressure heightens them and makes war an

ever-present possibility. The Soviets are playing "Russian roulette"—and the world waits, tense and expectant. How is the latest turn of the barrel to end?

Berlin: Between East and West

The present crisis over Berlin is three years old. It dates from Khrushchev's November 27, 1958, note to the three Western Powers, in which he demanded the convening of a conference to sign a peace treaty with Germany. If this were not done, he threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with the East German regime and to turn over to the East Germans control of the Western access routes to West Berlin. In that note, Khrushchev also proposed that West Berlin should be set up as a "free city"—demilitarized and neutralized. A showdown, however, was postponed as the Russians decided to wait, pending the outcome of the foreign ministers conference of May, 1959, Khrushchev's subsequent visit to the United States in September, 1959, the "Spirit of Camp David" atmosphere which existed until the U-2 incident of May 1, 1960, and Khrushchev's decision to withhold any direct action until he could assess the Kennedy administration.

In West Berlin, the Russians have a situation tailored to their on-again, off-again crisis diplomacy. The city is isolated geographically, 110 miles inside East Germany. The Western Powers do not recognize the Ulbricht regime. Their access to West Berlin is based on wartime Allied agreement, their dealings are with Soviet officials. Should Khrushchev's current threat materialize, the West will have to deal directly with the East German regime, a situation it opposes bitterly.

The precise reason for Khrushchev's reopening the Berlin crisis is obscure. Perhaps it is pressure from the Chinese to adopt a more aggressive attitude toward the West; an effort to exploit Western preoccupation with Laos and the Congo, and American embarrassment over Cuba; or a desire to legitimize the East German regime through Western recognition and fulfill the Kremlin's long standing objective of eliminating this political thorn from its flank. At present, West Berlin serves as an outlet through which hundreds of thousands of East

Germans flee to the West and as a continuing symbol of Western determination to resist Soviet pressure in Europe.

During Premier Khrushchev's meeting with President Kennedy in Vienna on June 3-4, he declared that the Berlin problem must be settled before the end of the year or the Soviet Union would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Since then tension has mounted steadily. On July 9, Khrushchev announced a \$3.5 billion increase in Soviet military expenditures for the current year and the suspension of its previously announced 1.2 million men reduction in military manpower. On July 25, President Kennedy warned the nation of the growing danger, reaffirmed the United States commitment to defend West Berlin, and called for \$1 billion more in military spending and reactivation of several National Guard divisions. Though the United States has repeated its willingness to negotiate, and Khrushchev is unlikely to precipitate a nuclear war over the Berlin issue, there is always the danger of the unplanned. In international relations, as in personal affairs, it is usually the unexpected and the undesired that intrudes, destroying the most careful of plans, and unleashing a chain of actions to upset all rational calculations.

Khrushchev has warned that he intends to sign a separate peace treaty with the Pankow regime before the end of the year. There is little reason to disbelieve him at this late date after he has committed so much of his prestige to a change in the present status of East Germany and West Berlin. Whether he will also turn over control of the access routes to West Berlin is a key question. Further, even if the Soviets do grant the East Germans control over access to the city, it remains to be seen whether Khrushchev will give them the order to interrupt the flow of Western traffic into the city. For it is over this exact issue that war or peace will rest. At this writing, the final outcome of the current Berlin crisis remains very much in doubt.

If the East Germans, with Soviet approval, blockade West Berlin, the Nato countries will have five broad alternatives: 1) further negotiation with the Soviets, and possibly diplomatic recognition of East Germany as the price for another temporary

settlement; 2) an air-lift along the lines of 1948-1949; 3) a military effort to break the blockade, which might conceivably be limited to small scale action, but which might easily lead to 4) an all-out nuclear war; 5) internationalization of the city.

None of these alternatives pleases the West. But recognition of East Germany may temporarily placate the Soviets, and end the current crisis. After three years, Khrushchev may feel that he must show something.

For the West, recognition of East Germany may be necessary. An extended airlift is expensive, and, psychologically, not so dramatic a move as it was in 1948. Under no circumstances could Nato permit West Berlin to become a "free city"—a euphemism for an eventual takeover by the Communists. Indeed, almost any accession to Soviet pressure may weaken American prestige in Europe, and jeopardize the future of Nato.

Germany is going to remain divided for a long time to come. One alternative which deserves further consideration, even though it is not now acceptable to either party for a variety of political reasons, is to place the *entire* city of Berlin under United Nations control until such time as a formal peace treaty for all of Germany is signed, or Germany is reunified. A necessary element in such a plan would be the granting to the United Nations of a guaranteed land corridor to some port. This corridor would be staffed by United Nations soldiers, and placed under United Nations control. The West would probably have to recognize the East German regime as the price for such an agreement. This is similar to the post-war interim internationalization of Trieste, which existed until the Italian and Yugoslav governments reached an agreement on the final solution for that city.

In early July, the East German regime declared that, effective August 1, all foreign aircraft entering its territory would have to be cleared prior to entry and transit. The West insisted that it would ignore the order as an infringement on its rights of access to West Berlin. Thus far, there has been no trial of strength.

Various Soviet objectives may be distinguished in the current crisis. The immedi-

ate objectives are to enhance the prestige of the East German regime, cut off the flow of refugees from the East, and eliminate West Berlin as a disturbing propaganda thorn in the side of Soviet leaders. Moscow seeks recognition for East Germany because its absence constitutes a reflection on the illegitimacy not only of the Soviet puppet in Pankow, but of the entire Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. The long range objective of the Kremlin is to force the Allies out of West Berlin, undermine West Germany's confidence in the ability and determination of Nato to live up to its commitments, and thus destroy Nato. If, as seems likely, Moscow signs a peace treaty with East Germany, the problem of finding an acceptable compromise on the status of West Berlin and Western access to the city will remain. However, Moscow can, if it desires, end the current crisis by committing the East German regime to acknowledge Western access rights pending an East-West settlement of the entire German problem.

On August 7, 1961, Premier Khrushchev repeated his intention to end the Allied occupation rights concerning access to West Berlin by signing a peace treaty with East Germany. Stating that West Germany is being built up by the West to spearhead an attack against the Soviet Union, he argued that "only a peace treaty can forestall the dangerous development of German militarism and revanchism." He also repeated his proposal to make West Berlin a "free city."

Should West Berlin be made a free city, as the Soviet Union suggests, that would not affect either the interests or the prestige of any state. We propose that it should be stipulated in the peace treaty that the free city of West Berlin shall be granted the freedom of communications with the outside world. We agree to the establishment of any most effective guarantees of the independent development and the security of the free city of West Berlin.

At the end of his speech he expressed the hope that the problems of Germany and Berlin would be settled at the peace table, thereby keeping open the path to the conference table. There will be negotiation, but the solution is uncertain.

During the past year, Laos, Cuba and the Congo have also dominated the international

scene as the canvas of the East-West struggle grew larger. Three years ago, crises erupted and receded in Quemoy, Iraq and Guinea; tomorrow they may explode as quickly in Iran, Vietnam, Cambodia and North Africa. Though the areas of Soviet-Western confrontation and competition in the underdeveloped world shift, the struggle there is unremitting, ever-intensifying and ever-widening.

However, these areas are not now of *decisive* importance for the Soviet Union or the West. They may perhaps be in 50 years. This is not meant to imply that what happens in the underdeveloped world is not important. It is. It demands our continual and concerted attention and aid. For example, what happens in Laos affects the entire political situation in Southeast Asia, and has further ramifications throughout the Far East. In Geneva, the diplomats talk, as the West tries to salvage some fragment from a deteriorated position, and the Communists seek to extend the area of their effective control. The West supports Prince Boun Oum. But Prince Souvanna Phouma, the neutralist, seems more likely to emerge as the head of the Laotian government. Behind him looms the figure of his dangerous half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong and the Communist Pathet Lao forces.

In this area, as in all others, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, seek to intrude their influence and bring to power Communist, pro-Communist, or anti-Western regimes. The battles are grim and wearing. They are fought with ideas, money and weapons. But their outcome can only be partially affected by what the West does or does not do. The ultimate choice lies with the nationalist élites, groping their way toward some acceptable political orientation and organization.

In its struggle with the Soviet Union, there is, however, one area where the West controls its own destiny, and what it does can have a profound impact upon the conduct and character of Soviet foreign policy. That area is in Europe.

Europe is divided at the Oder-Neisse. This artificial division is the central fact of European political life and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the economic, political and social differences in the

two areas become more marked with each passing year. Trade between Western and Eastern Europe is, on the average, less than four per cent of the total trade of the Western European countries, and less than 15 or 16 per cent of the total trade of the Eastern European countries—including the U.S.S.R. These indicators of economic and commercial exchange are not likely to alter meaningfully during the coming decade. Cultural and scientific exchanges are even more marginal.

Overshadowing this cleavage of Europe into two camps, and influenced by it, is the movement, present in both Western and Eastern Europe, toward integration. Each camp is engaged in an ambitious, determined, far-reaching quest for political and economic unity. In the East, the Soviet Union is seeking to develop a "socialist commonwealth," which would bind the Eastern European countries irrevocably to Moscow's *imperium*. Such an organization would also provide a convenient institutional framework for incorporating other nations into the Communist bloc. In the West, halting but nonetheless impressive strides have been taken to establish the basis for a united Europe.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union, like that of any Great Power, is subject to many pressures and priorities. It is also conditioned by many factors: historical, geographic, economic. One variable that has been accorded too little attention in the West is the impact of Marxist-Leninist ideology upon the behavior and expectations of the Soviet political élite. Soviet leaders share a deeply-held belief that capitalism is doomed, and that communism is destined to replace it as the supreme socio-economic-political system in the world. Reared under an aggressive, allegedly scientific world outlook, they have been taught that the West is experiencing a rapid collapse. As they view developments in the West, Soviet leaders can detect sufficient instances of strife and disruption to reinforce their ideological image, and, at the same time, to strengthen the mold of their present policy. Why, then, should they compromise on such crucial issues as the reunification of Germany, disarmament, or support for a stronger United Nations? Why should they relinquish their current diplomatic initiative or growing military superi-

ority? Certainly, the feats of Gagarin and Titov have made them even more confident of ultimate victory.

So long as nothing happens which significantly affects the Soviet belief in the inevitability of communism or the essential correctness of Moscow's approach to international relations, then, there is little prospect of any major change in Soviet foreign policy. In the short run, the West can do little to induce any fundamental shifts in Soviet policy. But the struggle against encroaching Soviet power will continue for decades, barring the possibility of nuclear catastrophe.

The West can, however, affect the long-run orientation of Soviet policy by pushing the political, economic, and military integration of the Western world. The ideal of an Atlantic Federation must become the reality of the next generation. For the West, nationalism has outlived its original purpose. Twice in a single generation it brought the West to the brink of disaster, and so weakened Europe as to permit the expansion of Soviet power to assume its present menacing proportions. There is no margin for a third fratricidal adventure.

The West has the population, the technology, the resources and the ideals to establish "a more perfect union" of free nations. If it did this, it could so far surpass the combined efforts of the Communist bloc in every field of endeavor—welfare, security, science, the arts and individual freedom—that the danger from the Soviet Union could be significantly eased within a generation. Western unity might also sow doubts among Soviet leaders concerning the infallibility of the Marxist-Leninist image of the West and its inevitable demise. Such doubts could perhaps lead Moscow to revise its estimates of the West, and induce it to accept a genuine "peaceful coexistence."

But Soviet leaders are tough, disciplined, ruthless men convinced that they have the key to the future. They will not be sidetracked from their ambitions by noble speeches or exhortations; nor will they abandon present policies unless they are convinced that their survival and security depend upon a fundamental revision of their current image of the Western world. Only through deeds can the West hope to mitigate the outward thrust from the Soviet empire.

In this discussion of Russian leadership of the Communist bloc, Stephen D. Kertesz concludes that "Soviet military and economic power remains the key to intra-bloc relations. China and the East Central European satellites depend on Soviet raw materials, industrial equipment and technological skills."

The U.S.S.R. and the Communist Bloc

By STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

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DEVELOPMENTS within the Communist bloc frequently appear somewhat paradoxical to Western observers, unversed as so many of them are in the purposes, methods and underlying assumptions of Marxist *Realpolitik*. Some accept the existence of a "Socialist Commonwealth of Nations" as a fact of life, and many wishful thinkers profess to detect in Khrushchev's "relaxed" domestic program the seeds of a "liberalization" in their own Western sense. Others believe that angry debates

among Communist states are a sign of weakness, a symptom of the bloc's disintegration, and forecast an increasingly serious rift between the two giants of the Communist world—the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China.

Not only has the bloc grown in power since 1955; it has become more diversified and sophisticated than anyone could have foreseen in Stalin's time. The era of "Socialism in one country" and the Comintern and Cominform belong to that bygone day. In its place there has developed—frequently in response to the needs of the moment—a complex inter-relationship of master to satellite, of Soviet tutor to "independent" fraternal parties. No longer does Moscow ordain bloc-wide policies without regard for the domestic interests of the regimes in Warsaw, Prague and elsewhere.

Today the U.S.S.R. presides over a heterogeneous empire and even boasts of a rather overbearing junior partner, who seeks to interpret Marxist dogma according to its own lights and thereby to influence the entire spectrum of bloc policies—domestic and foreign—in a way that does not always accord with Moscow's interests. That the once monolithic Communist system is becoming a two-headed structure is evidenced by the frequency with which most of the other Communist parties now pay tribute to *both* the Soviet and Chinese leaderships.

Where once members of the Communist camp danced a careful minuet in front of the old dictator, today they dance a merry

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quadrille which allows for many variations—even if the music still is directed by an experienced band master who pays the salaries of most of the orchestra members. Coordination has become more complex, but the bloc's flexibility has benefited. A seemingly open discussion of differences within the bloc does not mean a softening of communism. To the contrary, the dogma remains unchanged.

Sino-Soviet Relations

Identification of Communist leadership with leadership of the C.P.S.U. has been axiomatic and almost a natural part of Russian thinking. China's increasing influence in the Communist bloc and in world-wide relationships has been a natural development, though the speed with which Peking has intruded on Moscow's precincts was unexpected. To the Russians it may have come as a jolt. Stalin had little confidence in the Chinese Communist party and its leadership in the 1930's and thought no more highly of them in 1945 at the time of the signature of the post-Yalta treaty with Chiang Kai-shek.

Rivalry between two major centers of power is almost unavoidable: rivalry between Communist China and the U.S.S.R. is genuine in terms of their national interests, interpretation and application of ideology, and leadership in the Communist bloc. Who will dominate Asia? Where will the boundary line separate Soviet and Chinese spheres of influence? Who will be the infallible interpreter of Marxist doctrine and lead the Communist bloc? These problems form the core of a formidable antagonism between the two leading Communist states.

The Chinese have a feeling—indeed, it is inbred—of superiority; they suspect the Russians as they do everyone else. They dislike all foreigners. In recent years they have rediscovered their national interests and, like the Russians, tend to equate these interests with those of the international movement. In effect, they have challenged Soviet hegemony on the ground that Moscow seeks to advance “parochial,” Russian interests at their expense and that of other Communist states. For the most part such differences—couched as they are in terms

of fidelity to the Marxist *Weltanschauung*—constitute a far greater threat to the bloc's unity than do almost perennial territorial conflicts.

For a variety of reasons, including their economic difficulties, impoverishment and booming population, the Chinese take a harsher view of the world situation and advocate more violent policies to deal with it. Their demands became particularly strident when Soviet technological skill was amply demonstrated by the launching of ICBMs and Sputniks. They disapprove of Soviet support of non-Communist governments in Africa, the Middle East and South America, and they oppose any policy which might lead to an East-West *détente*. Thus, they abhor some of Khrushchev's propaganda slogans, such as “peaceful coexistence” or “immediate and complete disarmament.”

Furthermore, at the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. the Chinese did not welcome Khrushchev's theory of the “peaceful transition to Socialism.” At the Rumanian party congress in Bucharest in July, 1960, and at the Moscow meeting of the 81 Communist parties the following November, the Chinese openly attacked the Soviet position on a number of outstanding issues. The Soviets prevailed, particularly at Moscow, but only at the price of concessions to the Chinese. The draft program for the Twenty-second Congress of the C.P.S.U., published on July 30, 1961, pays mere lip service to the Chinese revolution, while the European satellites rate major attention. No mention whatever is made of Mao Tse-tung's contributions to Marxism-Leninism, although prior to July, 1960, his original and significant application of Marxist doctrine was repeatedly recognized.

Although Khrushchev gave economic and technical aid and made numerous political and doctrinal concessions to China, he was unwilling to give atomic weapons to the Chinese and to accept some of the bellicose Chinese suggestions in world politics. China was particularly dissatisfied because of the lack of Russian support in her attack against the offshore islands in 1958. Khrushchev knew that substantial Russian support could have led to an all-out war with the United States, and he was aware of the possible consequences: if the United

States and the U.S.S.R. mutually devastate each other in a nuclear war, China could become the dominant power in Eurasia. Chinese overlordship, involving an imposition of the Chinese brand of communism, is not a prospect appealing to the Russians.

China and East Central Europe

Chinese intervention in East Central European politics is an entirely new phenomenon dating from 1956. At first, mindful of their own past history vis à vis Moscow and of the brake which Stalin applied to their ambitions, the Chinese leaders may have been genuinely sympathetic to the complaints of the satellite nations. They may also have gambled that any weakening of Russian hegemony in the area would rebound to their own enhanced status within the bloc.

Chou En-lai visited Poland and Hungary and at least implicitly offered Peking's support to those people in Warsaw and Budapest who opposed a return to Rákosi-type policies. When the full import of the Polish and the Hungarian revolts of 1956 could no longer be ignored and the lack of popular support for communism was all too plain, the Chinese reversed themselves and became the Nemesis of "National Communism." Today they are the most bitter opponents of the Yugoslavs and the guarantors of Albania's continuing defiance of Moscow and the rest of the bloc.

The Albanian leadership long has been loathe to alter its draconic domestic policies—"de-Stalinization" never reached Tirana—or abandon its xenophobic view of the outside world. Albania and China are preoccupied with "external threats." China's attitude toward the United States is matched psychologically by Albania's fear of its hostile neighbors: Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece. Alarms over the "warlike" activities of these "enemies" are, of course, used by the Tirana regime—as they are by the Chinese—to justify internal repression and to keep the minds of the people off internal economic difficulties.

"Proletarian internationalism" has by no means weakened the Albanian determina-

tion to preserve national identity. Such a policy worked to Moscow's advantage in 1948, when the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture ended several years of Albanian vassalage to Belgrade and Tirana turned to Moscow as its last, best hope of "independence." Now, Khrushchev's denial that there is any danger of "capitalist encirclement" works against Moscow and may, indeed, account in large part for Tirana's obvious preference for the Chinese. An opportunity to register that preference came in the spring of 1960, when Peking brought its growing dispute with the Soviet leadership out into the open. For the first time, the Albanians sensed support for their militant dissent from Soviet policy and cast their lot with the Chinese at Bucharest in June and, again, at Moscow in November.*

Moscow has responded with economic pressure, innuendo in public speeches and the unprecedented attacks made on the Albanian leadership by East German boss Walter Ulbricht and Italian Communist chief Palmiro Togliatti. Elements of the Soviet submarine force reportedly withdrew from the Albanian base at the island of Sasseno. In return, the Chinese have replaced Moscow in the fields of foreign aid and technical assistance. In April, 1961, they announced a new long-term aid agreement, granting \$125 million worth of credits toward Albania's five year plan, 1961-1965, Chinese technicians appeared in large numbers in Tirana, and China has supplied Albania with 2.2 million bushels of the wheat it bought from Canada in April, 1961.

Though China seeks to play an ever more active role in intrabloc relations and to influence the bloc's policies vis à vis the non-Communist world, it is unlikely that she intends—at least at the present time—to try to wrest the leadership of the bloc from Moscow. The Sino-Soviet alliance is a marriage of convenience. China still is a vast, economically underdeveloped country which looks to Moscow and several Soviet industrially skilled satellites for its own internal development. Overriding common interests and ideology determine the form and dimension of the alliance and demand accommodation between the major partners. It would be a mistake to expect Sino-Soviet rivalry to facilitate the achievement of West-

* William E. Griffith, "An International Communism? Peiping, Tirana and Moscow: Polycentrism in Practice," *East Europe*, Vol. 10, 7 (July 1961), 3-45.

ern, specifically American, policy goals. The truth of the matter is that China and Russia handle their differences with exemplary moderation.

Russia's Europe

Even some astute Western statesmen believed that Stalin's death would be followed by revolutions and upheavals in the U.S.S.R. Although these expectations did not materialize, many transformations took place in the Soviet bloc which could have been used by Western diplomacy. The rigid policy of Stalin's last years was followed by a scramble for power of his heirs. The spectacular reconciliation with Tito and the Declaration of Belgrade, which emphasized every country's right to choose its own road to socialism, and above all else Khrushchev's denunciation of his former master strengthened anti-Stalinist forces and liberalizing trends in most of the satellites.

This process culminated in the Polish upheaval and Hungarian revolt of October, 1956, which constituted a heavy blow to communism. Khrushchev not only survived these events, but again showed his ability to use setbacks to his advantage. Western passivity in the face of Soviet military intervention in Hungary underlined the satellites' predicament: there was no alternative to Soviet control. Even before the tumultuous days of 1956, however, the local leaderships in Bulgaria, Rumania and Czechoslovakia—docile under Stalin, Malenkov and Khrushchev—posed no problems for Moscow.¹

In the case of Poland, Western reluctance to accept *de jure* the Oder-Neisse frontier, coupled with widespread apprehension of any German revival, helped limit the course of events in October, 1956. It was not long before the Poles began to look to the future—each according to his bent. The party militants around Gomulka set out to rebuild the power edifice, emphasizing the formal institutions of the party apparatus and the government.

Later further compromises were made

with respect to the "October goals." The excesses of anti-Soviet Polish nationalism were curbed during the *Po Prostu* riots of 1957. Gomulka's sweeping victory in the elections that same year aided the revitalization of the Polish party and the "revisionists" began to dwindle. By the latter half of 1959 the regime was able to weather an economic crisis, and in 1960 to announce a five-year economic development plan which held out little hope of a rise in living standards until at least 1964.

Poland's place within the bloc has changed radically since 1956. Gomulka's regime has succeeded in re-establishing its loyalty. Gomulka won the Kremlin's confidence and proved that a moderately liberalized Poland can remain a reliable and useful satellite. During his visit to Poland in 1959, Khrushchev endorsed all he had seen of Gomulka's "gradualist" policies, and no bloc theoretical formulations since then have failed to provide room for them. Gomulka emerged from the Bucharest and Moscow meetings in 1960 as a staunch supporter of Khrushchev and with the friendship of the U.S.S.R. firmer than ever before.

Although the October gains were gradually abolished, freedom of discussion remained, and cultural exchanges with the West have been continued. Poland is the only Communist bloc country where Western newspapers, periodicals, and books are available for the average man. At the same time, Poland has demonstrated that a Communist bloc country is able to receive economic help from and maintain friendly relations with the United States.

In Hungary Kádár has fared less well and his early promises concerning the maintenance of the achievements of the revolution were honored mostly in the breach. Although he promised a coalition government and free elections, as soon as the regime was consolidated, his wrath turned against those intellectuals and workers who had carried Imre Nagy to power. Arrests and executions were orders of the day.

Kádár's rule demonstrated the dilemma of the post-Stalin era. Although he denounced Stalinism and promised more freedom, it proved difficult to grant freedom on a piecemeal basis. Due to general unrest and continuing resistance by the workers, a par-

¹ In Czechoslovakia even the purges were of a rather eclectic nature and most of the native Communists proved to be virtuosos in survival. Satisfactory economic conditions, the "political realism" of the populace, widespread fear of Germany and memories of Western betrayal in 1938 and lack of interest in 1945, facilitated the work of the Communists.

tial return to Stalin's methods was thought expedient although there was no complete return to Rákosi's harsh rule. Soviet forces and police terror remained in the background.

Hungarians were confronted with Hobson's choice, and Kádár seemed more acceptable to most people than a Stalinist of the Rákosi type. The people realized the futility of resistance. In an atmosphere of intimidation Kádár succeeded in collectivizing about 90 per cent of the country's arable land. Khrushchev ostentatiously supported Kádár, who repeatedly received red carpet treatment in Moscow and other Communist capitals. Khrushchev himself participated in the Seventh Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party and revealed in one of his speeches that military intervention in Hungary was opposed by some of his comrades in the Kremlin. He argued that he could give no less help to the Hungarian people than Tsar Nicholas I did in 1849.

Through the Warsaw Pact,² Russia directs and controls the revived military might of the satellites. There are about 60 satellite divisions. Thus numerically the satellite contribution to the Communist bloc's military forces is considerable, though the reliability of the satellite armies is doubtful.

The overwhelming military power of the U.S.S.R. in the bloc is paralleled by the power monopoly of the Communist party, which has reasserted itself in numerous crises. The gap between formal authority and effective power has remained as great as ever in each Communist country. The state apparatus serves to implement party policy. Communist leadership rules by virtue of Soviet support. Most of the diplomatic representatives in the bloc are party officials, and there is a substantial blending of diplomatic and party channels of communication.

Within the bloc intergovernmental relations are a sheer formality. For these and other reasons, developments in the Soviet orbit cannot be analyzed meaningfully on the basis of intergovernmental relations. The hierarchy among the Communist parties and particularly the personal connections of the

various Communist leaders in Moscow are all important.

Relations have changed between the Kremlin and the satellites. Khrushchev has made concessions not only to China, but he has also taken developments in the satellite countries more into consideration than Stalin. Some aspects of human relations underwent truly fundamental changes, particularly among Muscovite and satellite leaders. Khrushchev introduced a dynamic itinerant diplomacy and many satellite leaders indulge in it. The flying Dutchman was replaced by flying commissars. Communist leaders go abroad and try to influence people through methods which vary according to place and time.

The Economic Factor

Since 1958 the complete integration of the satellite economies into a bloc-wide economic system has been the overriding objective of Soviet policy. At the Twenty-first C.P.S.U. Congress in January, 1959, Khrushchev emphasized the importance of integrating the East European states into plans formulated by the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Since then, the various satellite plans for long-range development have been drafted, and redrafted, to accord with the Soviet Seven Year Plan. Direction and supervision of national economic planning have become functions of COMECON.

Satellite heavy industry is increasingly dependent upon the delivery of Soviet industrial raw materials for which Moscow, in turn, receives manufactured goods. The U.S.S.R. determines the prices for both and thus maintains a stranglehold on the rate of economic growth and living standards of the captive nations. Soviet exploitation continues, though less drastically than under Stalin. Some of the satellites, particularly East Germany and Czechoslovakia, have established extensive overseas trade relations and play a major role in Moscow's assistance program for strategically important, underdeveloped countries.

The growth and diversification of satellite industries and increase of their trade with Asian, African, and Latin American countries might bolster national feeling and be useful to some of the satellites themselves in

² For the organizational pattern of the Communist bloc see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "The Organization of the Communist Camp," *World Politics* XIII (January 1961), 175-209, and *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict—Ideology and Power in the Relations among the USSR, Poland, Yugoslavia, China and the Other Communist States* (Harvard University Press, 1960).

the long run. For the time being their industrial and commercial expansion is directed by the Soviet Union and serves primarily the realization of world-wide Soviet objectives. These developments have an important long-range effect on relations between Western and Eastern Europe.

Even if Russian political control should disappear overnight, traditional economic relations between an industrialized East Central Europe and Western Europe would differ greatly from those that existed before the Second World War. The success of the European Economic Community, the preferential system of the free trade area, and a possible blending of the two groups show the future trend in Western Europe. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe remains the only international forum wherein the Eastern and Western European states meet and on occasion achieve a limited degree of cooperation mainly in technical matters.

Soviet military and economic power remains the key to intrabloc relations. China and the East Central European satellites depend on Soviet raw materials, industrial equipment and technological skills. Moscow's military power has had both positive and negative effects. The U.S.S.R. proved in 1956 its willingness to use force of arms to suppress an unruly satellite and maintain the power monopoly of a local Communist party. On the other hand, Moscow's refusal to lend its all-out support to Chinese designs on the offshore islands doomed to failure Chinese military action in the Formosa Straits.

Moreover, Soviet achievements in rocketry and space technology and Moscow's seeming ability to transform such tangible evidence of its industrial skill into political power have strengthened the Kremlin's authority within the bloc. Soviet propaganda is in this respect supported by hard facts.

The question of war or peace depends to a large extent on one man. That man, Nikita Khrushchev, indeed is a colorful personality; he can be cruel and unscrupulous,

and many times it is difficult to distinguish in him the statesman from the propagandist and the megalomaniacal demagogue. He has been bragging about Soviet missiles, rockets, and other weapons, and has been pouring a shower of threats on the United States and its allies.

Resumption of nuclear weapons tests are intended to "shock" the Western powers into negotiations on Berlin and other issues on Soviet terms. Khrushchev has been trying to use the balance of terror for realization of Soviet objectives and nuclear blackmail greatly impressed the "positive neutralists" at the Belgrade Conference. Threats and abusive language became part and parcel of Soviet diplomacy and psychological warfare.

Dictators have difficulty in understanding the attitudes of free societies. Khrushchev often misjudges the West, and he could easily miscalculate our probable response to a threat. It is by no means certain that Soviet diplomats dare to report accurately conditions in Western countries and particularly Western reactions to some of Khrushchev's policies and statements. Soviet evaluation of facts, even if accurately reported, is clouded by ideological preconceptions.

It is most perilous when leading politicians have a confused view of foreign countries and come to believe their own propaganda. In addition to these and other germane factors Khrushchev's impulsive temperament creates situations full of danger. He asserted on August 11, 1961, that the issue over the German peace treaty involved "the question of our fight for the recognition of our grandeur." This statement, reminiscent of Hitler's outbursts, may be part of an irresponsible game, but certainly it does not facilitate negotiations with Khrushchev and the establishment of bases for agreement. It is an antic out of place in the atomic age. The delusion of grandeur can prepare the way to disaster in our time. But Khrushchev, unlike Hitler, is not an unbalanced lunatic, and his actions can be influenced by the West's strength, unity and resolve.

"Malaria is the chief threat to health and life in tropical Africa, causing about one third of all deaths among tribal Africans."

From a Twentieth Century Fund study, 1961.

Noting that "giantism militates against efficient farm management in the Soviet Union," this agricultural specialist summarizes Russia's farm difficulties, including the serious problems of "weather, peasant morale and organizational structure."

Soviet Agriculture: A Continuing Problem

By LAZAR VOLIN

United States Department of Agriculture

ON MARCH 3, 1861, just one day before Lincoln's inauguration, Alexander II, the autocrat of all the Russias, was trying to solve the Russian agrarian problem by decreeing the emancipation of serfs and allotting to the great majority of them some farm land but at a stiff price. An even century later, the top Communist boss, Nikita Khrushchev, was storming the length and breadth of the country in a campaign to remedy the ills of collective farming, which replaced the once predominantly small peasant agriculture. Thus, the agricultural problem, in a changing form, is still very much to the fore in Russia. And this despite the fact that the country has lost its once predominantly agrarian character and has become the second largest industrial power in the world, that it has collectivized its agriculture and drawn it into the orbit of a

planned socialist economy, and that it has had eight years of Khrushchev's reforms to boot.

When one turns to Khrushchev's numerous speeches of last winter dealing with the agricultural situation, one learns that his concern is essentially with an old problem, agricultural underproduction. It is underproduction relative to high official goals, reflecting the demands of a population which is growing at the annual rate of 3.5 to 4 million and becoming increasingly urbanized. These people, from all available evidence, want to cash in on what has long and frequently been promised to them by the Communist rulers and particularly by Khrushchev; namely, an improvement in the standard of living, which means a better diet; less and better quality bread (which, together with potatoes, now predominates in the Russian caloric intake) and more and greater variety of meat, dairy products, fats, fruits and vegetables. They also want an end to the frequently recurring irregularities and shortages in the food supply. As Khrushchev put it, irregularities in food supply "cannot be put into soup."

This explains Khrushchev's preoccupation with agricultural underproduction. He said last January that "without a well-developed agriculture, without an abundance of farm products, there cannot be a prosperous socialist economy. The struggle for a continued expansion of agriculture—this is a most important prerequisite for building a Communist society. . . ." It is paradoxical, but nonetheless true, that while Khrushchev

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has been talking about catching up and overtaking the United States economy, he has had to struggle with food shortages and inadequacies, and to spur production, while we grapple with the problem of farm abundance.

Yet this does not mean that there has been no progress in Russian agriculture, especially during the post-Stalin era. First and most important, is the spectacular expansion of the crop acreage by 114–116 million acres between 1953 and 1960–1961, nearly 40 per cent of it in spring wheat. This brought the Russian acreage to more than 500 million acres, the largest area under crops in any country of the world. Most of the increase took place between 1954 and 1956 as a consequence of Khrushchev's ambitious project of expansion of the virgin or long-uncultivated land east of the Volga and the Urals.

This program, however, has serious drawbacks. The most important is the unfavorable climate, foreseen at the outset by Western specialists and, no doubt, also by many Soviet specialists who could not publicly criticize the Kremlin line. Most of this land is in the semi-arid zone where devastating droughts, aggravated by scorching winds and blowing soil, frequently recur. The growing season, moreover, is short, limiting the choice of crops, practically eliminating, for instance, such high-yielding fall-sown crops as winter wheat. By the same token, the harvest season comes late and usually coincides with inclement weather, even with frosts and snows, increasing enormously the difficulty of harvesting and making for large crop losses. This is what happened during the harvest in 1959 and 1960 in these regions, bringing Khrushchev's ire and disgrace to some important officials, who were accused of mismanagement.

Climate and Weather Conditions

The situation in the Eastern regions epitomizes in a more extreme form what is generally true of agriculture over a large part of the country; namely that the Soviet farmers have a stiffer battle to wage against the climate than their counterparts in the United States and Western Europe. Khrushchev's favorite crop, corn, is a case

in point. Moved by the need to bolster the lagging animal feed supply and inspired by the example of the United States, Khrushchev has been enthusiastically promoting the growing of corn, which he called admiringly the "queen of the fields." Corn acreage, which was of minor importance in the Soviet agricultural pattern, was increased nearly sevenfold between 1954 and 1960. But of the nearly 70 million acres planted to corn in 1960, less than 13 million were harvested as fully mature dry grain. The rest was used as immature corn for silage and green fodder; the latter, according to Khrushchev, often more weeds than corn. On the other hand, in the United States only a small proportion of the huge corn crop is harvested immature. But climatic conditions over a large part of the Soviet Union are adverse to the growing of fully mature corn, for it is either too cold or too dry.

Weather conditions are responsible for the wide fluctuation of harvests from year to year which are so characteristic of Soviet agriculture. Thus, if we review the grain harvests during the last five years, we find a record crop in 1958, a good crop during the current year, and three years of mediocre crops—mainly because of fluctuating weather. And with an enormous acreage even small variations in yields per acre are magnified into large changes in total output.

At this juncture it is pertinent to point out that the crop statistics emanating from the Soviet Union are far from reliable. This is not because statistical procedures are new in Russia, as they are in most underdeveloped countries. On the contrary, systematic collection of Russian crop statistics dates back as far as the 1880's. Considerable deterioration occurred in the 1930's when the published crop estimates were changed from a crop-in-the-barn basis to the so-called "biological yields" or pre-harvest sample estimates of crops standing in the fields. These took no account of the huge, officially acknowledged, harvesting and postharvest losses, and so they greatly exaggerated the crop out-turn.

The faulty practice was supposed to have been officially corrected after Stalin's death in 1953. However, when the new official figures for grain crops began to be published they appeared to be overstated for more

recent years. During the past year, added substance was given to the skepticism of Western specialists by widespread revelations in the Soviet press, confirmed by Khrushchev, of statistical falsification by farm managers and local officials, anxious to show fulfillment of often unrealistic high production and state purchasing goals. Yet, even after we make large deductions for overreporting from Soviet estimates, the grain crop during the years 1956-1960 averaged more than 100 million tons as against around 80 million tons during 1949-1953.

Despite the optimistic official crop estimates put out by the Soviet government for 1959 and 1960, Khrushchev admitted the adverse effect of the unfavorable weather conditions. Though he mainly blamed—and no doubt with much justification—farm managers and officials for the unsatisfactory agricultural situation, yet he showed also considerable concern over the problem of stabilization of crop yields against unfavorable weather, particularly against the drought. In this connection, he stressed in his January, 1961, report to the Central Committee the importance of irrigation. This is harking back to the last year of Stalin's regime when an ambitious program of irrigation in the European part of the country was initiated in connection with hydroelectric power development on the Volga, Don and Dnieper Rivers. This program was largely jettisoned after the Stalin regime, and Khrushchev's project of expansion in dry farming areas was adopted. Irrigation, therefore, remained largely confined to the cotton growing regions in the Soviet Central Asiatic republics and Trans-Caucasia.

Now large-scale irrigation development is being revived by Khrushchev, who envisages it as a long-range development which will not bear significant fruit during the next five years. While some improvement of yields may come from better farm practices, vagaries of the weather will have to be reckoned with for some time to come by Soviet planners and farm managers. Here is a very significant but often overlooked difference between Soviet agriculture and industry, partially helping to explain their uneven development.

Turning to the livestock sector, which had long been the weakest spot in Soviet agriculture, we find again evidence of progress in recent years, particularly in the increase of the herds. The number of cows and all cattle increased by more than a third between 1954 and 1961; sheep numbers increased by a third and the number of hogs—the most rapidly breeding animal—by over three-fourths. The socialist livestock sector (collective and state farms) has grown even more rapidly. But only a little over one-half of the cows at the beginning of 1961 were in the collective and state farms, and the rest were privately owned by peasants and city workers. In 1954, the socialist sector accounted for only one-third of all cows. When it comes to the output of animal products, such as meat and milk, we are confronted with an overreporting bias similar to that encountered in crop statistics. In making comparisons between the Soviet Union and the United States, there is the further difficulty that statistical concepts differ. The Russians for instance combine animal fat and offals with meat; in United States statistics they are reported separately. When the necessary downward adjustments are made, the Soviet production of red meats and poultry in 1960 appeared to be less than half of that in the United States. The Soviets did better with milk production, which, on an adjusted basis, was not quite 10 per cent below that of the United States. Since, moreover, population in the Soviet Union is nearly a fifth larger than in the United States, the per capita supply of animal products is considerably lower in the Soviet Union.

Increased output of these foodstuffs will depend on the growing production of feed, its more efficient utilization and on general improvement in livestock production management. Progress has undoubtedly been made along these lines, but obviously a great deal more will have to be done before the Soviet Union accomplishes Khrushchev's much touted goal of catching up with the United States. In this connection, it would seem that the blind imitation of United States feed practices, represented by Khrushchev's over-emphasis on corn, is not so helpful to expansion of the livestock industry as a better balanced feed program

would have been. There are, however, indications of a somewhat more balanced approach to the feed problem, even on the part of Khrushchev, himself, who, without losing his enthusiasm for corn, is beginning to stress other feed crops, particularly sugar beets and barley.

Agricultural Improvement

Beyond a better choice of crops, the increase in the feed supply will depend essentially on improvement of yields of crops per acre. This is in general the path of agricultural improvement in Russia, for there is a limit to the area of land that could be easily brought under cultivation without heavy expenses of reclamation or irrigation construction. While the main reliance must be and is placed by Soviet planners on improvement of yields, there are not only serious climatic limitations, pointed out before, but also institutional obstacles. This brings us to the operation of the collective farm system.

That the system was in a parlous condition at the time of Stalin's death was admitted by the late dictator's heirs, and by none more emphatically than Khrushchev. One of the chief weaknesses was a lack of economic incentives to induce the peasants to work hard and efficiently. The root cause was the very low prices paid by the government for the required large deliveries of farm products to the state. The result was low income to the collective farms and, in turn, often pitifully small payments to the peasants for their labor, which made it necessary for them to rely on their small kitchen garden plots and privately owned livestock for subsistence. Why should they, under such conditions, exert themselves to work on the collective farm fields?

Much has been done by the government since 1953 to remedy this situation. Prices paid for products acquired from farmers were raised and were three times as high in 1959 as in 1952. Grain prices, which were very low, were increased 7.4 times during this period, whereas the prices paid for so-called industrial crops, which were considerably higher during the base year, were raised much less; cotton prices, for instance, by only 7 per cent, but sugar beet prices were more than doubled. Animal

products were increased on the average 5.6 times. As a result of the price increases and larger volume of sales to the government, all farm revenue from this source increased more than 5 times between 1952 and 1959. The cash income of collectives from all sources more than tripled during the period. Yet not all of this increase was translated into increased earnings of the farmers. A considerable proportion of the augmented revenue was used for larger capital investment, for the purchase of farm machinery from the liquidated machine-tractor stations and other production expenses and was not distributed to the peasants. On the other hand, a large though declining share of the peasants' income comes from payments in kind, mainly in grain, by collective farms and from their private little plots and livestock, including under this head both their own consumption and sales on the free market.

It should be borne in mind that increased economic incentives mean to the peasants not only rubles and food, but also textiles and many other manufactured consumers goods. The Soviet economy has become more consumer-oriented during the post-Stalin era and the draft of the new Party Platform promises pies in the sky in the future utopia, yet heavy industry continues to be the most favored priority sector. This tends to retard the growth, the availability, the badly needed improvement in quality and the distribution of the supply of manufactured consumers goods, with correspondingly adverse effects on economic incentives.

No systematic statistical data on the personal income of farmers have been published by the Soviet government since the prewar period. It claimed, however, an increase of 45 per cent in real income per farm worker from all sources, including his private farming, between 1953 and 1959 and 86 per cent between 1950 and 1959. Though these figures, if the estimates are correct, appear substantial, they represent increases over a very low base and leave the peasants' income still far behind that of factory workers, whose standard of living also is low. It is symptomatic that the claimed increases in income of the peasants 30 years after collectivization still include earnings derived from their small private plots and livestock.

"An-Acre-and-a-Cow"

Originally the government program for increased incentives during the post-Stalin years included as an important ingredient the encouragement of such "an-acre-and-a-cow" farming, as well as of the limited free retail market in which the peasants individually and the collectives can sell at high prices their produce, if any is left beyond their own needs after the state secures its share. This remnant of individual agriculture has played a signal role in the economic life of the peasantry as a source of food and cash. It also accounted for a significant share of the city food supply, particularly of animal products and vegetables despite higher prices than in State Stores.

By competing with the giant socialist sector for the labor and loyalty of the peasants, the dwarf private sector has been a thorn in the Kremlin's flesh. It was usually in critical periods when a rapid increase of food production was urgently needed that the "acre-and-a-cow" farming was encouraged by the government, but only as a temporary expedient. Once the collective farm system showed an improvement, the government's attitude usually became much more frigid; this has been, on the whole, the situation during recent years. Yet the vitality of such small private farming is attested by the fact that it accounted in 1959 for close to one half of total Soviet meat and milk production, more than 80 per cent of eggs, 46 per cent of green vegetables, and nearly two-thirds of potato production.

There can be no question of the peasants' strong attachment to their little private holdings and animals nor their continuing, though diminishing, role in the urban food supply. The government apparently is not inclined to take any drastic action and the uneasy coexistence of the two sectors may continue for some time. But one can never tell.

Another significant phase of the economic incentives program is the effort to rationalize methods of paying the peasants in collectives. Many farms in recent years have been experimenting with paying the peasants entirely in cash instead of using the traditional dual method, partly in kind and partly in

cash; in the process the cumbersome work unit system used in computing earnings is abandoned. Steps also have been taken to regularize payments, whatever the system used, in the form of monthly or quarterly advances instead of relying, as was customary, entirely on end-of-the-year settlements. The peasant, thus, remains a residual shareholder in the collective, who shares in all the risks but has very little to say about running the enterprise; nevertheless, the effect of the "advances" is to render his payments more certain and prompt.

Economic Incentives

Abundant evidence has been provided by Soviet publications and official pronouncements that increased economic incentives pay off in greater willingness to work and better performance of the peasant farmers. But that farm efficiency is still low is underscored by Khrushchev's figures for 1956-1957, indicating that labor requirements per unit of produce were from 2.3 to 7.3 times higher on Soviet collective farms and from 80 per cent to 320 per cent higher on Soviet state farms than on United States farms.

The Soviet farm labor force, though it has decreased since the prewar, and especially the precollectivization period, is still large. In 1959, about 48 million workers including members of collective farm households and other workers' families, were engaged in agricultural production. This is about 45 per cent of the total Soviet labor force as compared with 8-10 per cent of the total labor force engaged in agriculture in the United States.

The efficiency of labor depends not only on incentive but also on the extent to which it is supported by capital input and on the organizational structure of agriculture and the character of management.

The Soviet Union uses much less capital in agriculture than the United States and most other advanced industrial nations. However, considerable effort has been made during the post-Stalin era, lacking a formerly abundant pool of rural labor, to increase capital investment and inputs in agriculture, which it lacked during the Stalin regime. Take a few selected indicators: the number of tractors increased between the end of

1953 and 1959 by 40 per cent; the number of grain combines by 55 per cent and of trucks by 72 per cent. Yet the Soviet Union in 1959 had somewhat over one million tractors as against nearly 4.8 million in the United States; or one tractor for every 70 acres of sown crop land in the United States compared with one tractor for every 485 acres in the Soviet Union. The figures for combines were less than 500,000 for the Soviet Union and more than one million for the United States; and for motor trucks on farms, 729,000 in the Soviet Union as against 3.1 million in the United States. Farm electrification, especially the use of electric power in production, is in its infancy. While heavy farm operations like plowing are mechanized, there is still much hand labor in Soviet agriculture. The lack of adequate all-weather roads is another serious handicap to rural Russia.

The supply of commercial fertilizer available to Soviet agriculture increased by nearly 70 per cent between 1953 and 1959. But in 1959 it was only a little over one-third (measured in total plant nutrients) of the amount of fertilizer applied in the United States, and it was used much less efficiently in the U.S.S.R.

"Bigness" Trend

On the negative side, there has been no deviation from the trend toward supercollectivization and farm giantism which began during the later years of the Stalin regime under the aegis of Khrushchev. Collective farms have continued to be enlarged by mergers or absorption by state farms. (The collective farm or *kolkhoz* consists of pooled holdings created by forced collectivization of formerly independent small peasant farms. A state farm or *sovkhoz*, as the name implies, is owned and operated by the government with the aid of hired labor just like any Soviet factory.) The number of collectives decreased from more than 250,000 at the beginning of 1950 to about 45,000 at the end of 1960 (including about 1,000 of fishing and other collectives). The average sown area per collective in 1960 was nearly 6,800 acres, or more than three times as much as before the war. The collective was still the predominant farm

type in 1960, when it accounted for more than 60 per cent of the total sown area. But its share has been declining since 1953 when it accounted for 84 per cent of a smaller sown area.

State farms, of which there were 7,386 in 1960, on the other hand are gaining in importance, with more than one-fourth of the total sown area in 1960 as compared with about 10 per cent in 1953. They are even larger than the collectives. The average sown crop land per state farm in 1959 was more than 20,000 acres. In the New Lands region of Kazakhstan the average sown area exceeds 55,000 acres per state farm. Whether state farms, which the Communist ideology considered a superior type of farm organization, will continue to forge ahead and in a few years replace the *kolkhozy*, thus completing the etatization of Russian agriculture, is a moot question. Much will depend upon whether the Soviet government is willing to accord to all peasants the status of regular wage-earners in state enterprises instead of giving them a kind of share cropper status under the *kolkhoz* system.

The enlargement of farms has been carried out throughout the vast territory of the Soviet Union; in the vast level steppes of the South and East as well as in the northern and western regions where the landscape is crisscrossed by forests, lakes and marshes, and the farmland is in small plots. In one such northern district, 137 small villages with poor roads were merged into one collective. This is an extreme case, but it is symptomatic of the trend toward farm giantism which is rooted in the Soviet veneration of bigness and the confusion of the huge size of a farm unit with an optimum efficient size. That errors were made in farm mergers even Khrushchev recently admitted and others have cautiously followed him. That giantism militates against efficient farm management in the Soviet Union can hardly be disputed. The mergers also greatly increase the gap between the rank and file membership of collectives and the management, actually selected by the government. Self-government of collectives thus becomes a complete fiction.

Next to farm mergers, the most important recent institutional change in the collective

(Continued on p. 303)

"The possibility of eliminating part of the waste in the Russian economy represents an additional reserve for future economic growth, for increases in the well-being of the population, or for both," warns this specialist, who believes that "for those against whom Khrushchev's 'peace' policies are directed . . . optimism seems out of place."

The Price of Soviet Industrialization

By NAUM JASNY

Specialist in Russian Affairs

AFTER the Fifteenth Party Congress in December, 1927, the Soviet Union embarked on a drive to industrialize. The drive, called the Great Industrialization Drive in this writer's *Soviet Industrialization, 1928-52* (University of Chicago Press, 1961), must be recognized as successful, possibly even very successful, as far as the amounts produced are concerned.

The official Soviet "statistics," showing a 30-fold increase in industrial production in 1928-1959, are valueless as far as readers outside the country of real "democracy" are concerned. But the tendency in the other direction to minimize Soviet economic growth is a serious handicap to the forming of Western policies. This belittling has greatly abated but still exists in the United States and in its Congress even after the Sputniks and Gagarin's flight around the earth.¹

The great majority of serious students agree on an approximately 11-fold to 12-fold increase of the industrial output over the period stated.² Net investment probably increased even more. In corroboration is the fact that freight transports other than by animal power rose about 11-fold during the period.³

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The stated increase in industrial production sufficed to convert the U.S.S.R. from an underdeveloped to an industrialized country. The urban population indeed almost quadrupled from 1926 to 1960. While in 1926 the urban group represented only 18 per cent of the total, almost half (49 per cent) of the total population was urban in 1960.⁴

The prewar portion of the Great Industrialization Drive was permeated with particularly great (Communist-made) difficulties. Only three years (1934-1936) were favorable from the Soviet point of view in the prewar decade 1930-1940. In 1931 and 1932, the end years of the *All-Out Drive* period, the growth of industrial production was rapidly slowing down. The year 1933 was of a transitory nature and unfavorable on the whole. In three of the four years of the *Purge Era* (1937-1940) industrial production was near stagnation, while in 1937, the


¹ A rarer form of unwarranted optimism is the belief that the more rapid growth of the economy of the U.S.S.R. (a less developed country) than of that of the U.S. (a more developed country) is natural and that this is all there is to it. This attitude would be understandable, if, say, Canada or India were the less developed country. The "peace" activities of the U.S.S.R. look dangerous with Soviet national income not quite half that of the U.S. What if this ratio rises to, say, three-quarters or more? Moreover, the high rates of growth of the Soviet economy have resulted partly because the U.S.S.R. is a less developed country but primarily because of a high investment and low private income rates.

² N. M. Kaplan and R. H. Moorsteen, "An Index of Soviet Industrial Output," *The American Economic Review*, June, 1960, p. 296, estimated the industrial production other than that of armaments in 1958 at 8:1 times that of 1927-1928. To this must be added the growth in 1959 and an upward adjustment needs to be made for the much more rapid growth in output of armaments, not considered by the authors.

³ Transport by railways in tons with an adjustment for the share of railways in total transports other than by animal power in ton-kilometers. Commonly the index of transports in ton-kilometers, showing for the period stated an almost 15-fold growth, is used for such comparisons. But this index yields an exaggerated picture when used as an indicator of economic growth.

⁴ Official Statistical Yearbook for 1959, p. 9.

GROWTH OF SOVIET NATIONAL INCOME AND ITS COMPONENTS, 1928-52¹



¹ Reproduced with kind permission of the University of Chicago Press from N. J., *Soviet Industrialization, 1928-52*, Chicago, 1961. See also note to table on p. 2 of the book.

first year of the era, growth was rapidly declining.⁵

Serious handicaps to rapid economic growth, likewise Communist-made, could be observed in abundance in postwar years also. The most important of these probably were the excessive starts with new construction at least in 1950–1956 and consequently greatly reduced entrees of capacities into production, which led to a reduction in the rates of growth in 1956–1958. The handicaps were, however, much smaller in the postwar years than the detrimental phenomena of the periods, *All-Out Drive* and *Purge Era*. It is of very great importance for the West that in the recent 1950's Soviet industrial growth was more rapid and incomparably more smooth than that of the earlier decade of the 1930's. With small exceptions in both directions the rate of industrial growth in the 1950's was within the narrow range of 8–10 per cent. In 1947–1950 the rates of industrial growth were even much larger than in 1951–1960, but those were recovery years. In any case *we face almost fifteen years of strong, reasonably smooth industrial growth.*⁶

In the shift from minimizing the Soviet economic threat to a more correct appraisal of Soviet capabilities, the Sputniks and especially Gagarin's flight helped as eye openers. But the great rate of economic growth and especially the missiles were also misleading. The missiles point to immense scientific development and extraordinary techniques and precision in executing the scientific findings. This fact together with that of the conversion of an underdeveloped into an industrialized country in a short time (World II and the years of recovery from this must be excluded from the roughly 30-year period) are accepted as proof of Soviet boasts that the great rates of growth have been brought about by good planning, only possible in a "socialist state." Planning insures rapid and smooth

development. A closer analysis shows that the reality is quite different.

To begin with, the Soviet growth was, until recently, only quantitative. The Soviets are indulging in a claim that labor productivity in industry increased 8.8-fold in 1928–1959.⁷ The real increase from 1928 to 1959 was, however, not very much greater than two-fold—a very small attainment, considering the very low productivity in 1928 and the great length of the period. As was shown, industrial output rose 11–12 times. The labor force in industry grew 5.4-fold during the period according to official data. Both figures imply the percentage rise in labor productivity in industry stated above. The Soviets were just shooting for quantity of output and sacrificed everything else. The extent to which quality was disregarded is indeed difficult to visualize.

Irrationality and Inefficiency

The top-grade science which produced the Sputniks is a great exception for the Soviets. Even the natural sciences are not all on a high level. Sociologists including economists and statisticians and biologists also are little more than slaves, cogs in the largely mendacious propaganda machine.

Top-grade and precise techniques, indispensable to the conquest of space, are even rarer than top-grade science. In addition to the field of missiles, they are probably found also in the production of some armaments but in general poor quality is a characteristic of Soviet industry and of most of the Soviet economy.

There are many travellers now to the U.S.S.R. so that the poor quality of Soviet consumer goods including housing has become common knowledge in the United States. An American delegation of economists to the U.S.S.R. in 1960 reported on their visit to the Research Institute of the Gosplan U.S.S.R. in Moscow:

The Institute of Research was four years old at the time of our visit. It was housed in a structure built especially for the Institute. The building appeared older than its actual three years, a condition of construction we noticed many times in the USSR.

In a Soviet newspaper a Russian complained that a Russian can be recognized at

⁵ *All-Out Drive* (1930–1932) and *Purge Era* (1937–1940) are stages of the Great Industrialization Drive, distinguished by this writer.

⁶ The whole period since the Bolshevik revolution must be considered to appraise the attainments (and the guilt) of Soviet power. But the use of the data on Soviet growth during this long period to form an idea of the threat from the Kremlin in the future, as even the President does on poor advice, can be only harmful. For appraising this threat the developments in the recent past are much more relevant, perhaps the only ones relevant.

⁷ Statistical Yearbook for 1959, p. 85.

once as such by his clothes. A Soviet paper reported a man who insisted on wearing a pair of shoes without interruption for four years because they were of foreign make.

With reference to both consumer goods and housing there has been deterioration, in many cases serious deterioration, compared with these products before the start of the Great Industrialization Drive. Even so, many of them were at that time inferior in quality to those before the Revolution. The quality of many goods now produced is thus greatly below that of 50 or 60 years ago. This is true specifically of clothing, but also of flour and many other goods. The conditions of the sellers' market for some 45 years would be a sufficient explanation for this phenomenon. But actually the direct producers of the goods bear only part of the blame, in some cases none at all. The direct producers cannot produce goods of high quality because they are supplied with poor raw materials; they must use poor machinery and frequently receive poor spare parts for the machinery or none at all.

The textile industry, for example, is supplied with poor cotton (excessive moisture; excessive foreign matter). Since no premiums for better varieties of wheat were paid for 45 years, the wheat marketed now is inferior to that marketed at the end of the last century. Even more harmful were such practices with reference to barley used in beer production. And so on.

The inferior quality of the goods produced in the U.S.S.R., if discussed in this country at all, is almost always limited to consumer goods and treated as an isolated factor. But the preceding discussion has already led us deep into the realm of farm products and producer goods. An unhealthy form of farm organization and poor functioning of highly centralized planning and control resulted in poor quality of all goods. The harm done by the phenomenon of sellers' markets in the case of consumer goods was matched in the case of producer goods by centralized allocation

of the implements and raw materials. The State enterprises had to use what they were given. And the urge to turn out quantity even at the expense of quality had been possibly about as great with reference to producer as with reference to consumer goods.

Waste and its Causes

Not enough emphasis is placed on the fact that poor quality mostly means waste. Possible savings accruing from poor construction are negligible as compared with the cost of additional repairs, which frequently start at once after completion of the construction. In a similar manner, the saving on producing galoshes which last only half the reasonable time is almost zero compared to the involved loss. Immense losses are caused by poor quality of the machinery and spare parts.

Waste is not limited to poor quality. The Soviet economy is actually permeated by waste caused by all kinds of irrationalities and inefficiencies. The drive for ever greater rates of growth in quantity of output is one of the factors causing this waste but there are also others in operation. In some important cases even the growth of the economy, so much desired, is impaired. The principal additional reasons for the waste are errors of dogma, poor organization (i.e., poor planning, the same planning which allegedly brings about smooth, well coordinated development of the Soviet "socialist" economy) and, last but not least, dictatorship. These problems seem to be a virtually untouched subject in Western literature and, as far as the subject is mentioned, one sometimes encounters declarations which would be more appropriate in Soviet publications.⁸

The harm caused by wrong dogma was most pronounced in that no interest (or profit) on invested capital is counted. This distorts the whole price system. Investment costs specifically were affected. Under such conditions, the more capital-intensive the output of a certain product is, the lower its production costs seem to be. This is very pronounced and harmful in the output of electric power, most pronounced and most harmful in hydroelectric power. The cost of the latter appears in the Soviet account up to several times lower than it actually is. An immense amount of misinvestment has been caused by this factor alone.⁹

⁸ See this writer's "A Note on Rationality and Efficiency in the Soviet Economy" in *Soviet Studies*, Glasgow, April, 1961, pp. 353-375, and July, 1961, pp. 35-68, where the irrationalities and inefficiencies in the Soviet economy are discussed in some, although insufficient, detail.

⁹ As far as investment is concerned, an inadequate substitute for the interest rate was very recently introduced in the form of calculating the number of years in which the investment will be covered by the savings attained by it. But the prices continue to be set without consideration of the capital needed to produce the goods.

Wrong Dogma

A kind of dogma is the predilection for electric power, especially hydroelectric power, which *inter alia* leads to neglect of the diesel locomotive, admirably suited as the principal source of railway traction to Russian conditions with immense supplies of petroleum. The use of the diesel locomotive incidentally involves not only big savings in current costs, but also in investment, so vitally important for the U.S.S.R.

Neglect of the factor of interest on capital is only one cause of chaos in the price system. The distorted state of the price setting in the U.S.S.R. is actually almost indescribable. One example will have to do. The increase in the prices paid by the State to collective farms for the delivered farm products in the period from 1952 to 1958 ranged from nothing (0.06 per cent, to be exact) for cotton to 1,282 per cent for sheep and goats (for slaughter). Both products were by no means exceptions. The price paid, for example, for hemp fiber was raised by 43 per cent, that for millet by 1,160 per cent or 27 times more.¹⁰

Nikita Khrushchev does not tire of praising himself for the increase in the output of farm products by 51 per cent in 1953-1958 (exaggerated). The rise was to a considerable extent caused by those price rises, which for all farm products amounted to 196 per cent on a weighted average. The Communist party is of course responsible for the fact that prices were immensely low and immensely uneven in 1952. But the prices established in 1958 are also far from balanced.

Freezing of thought, following established lines, was most pronounced. Contrary to the United States, the U.S.S.R. continued to rely predominantly on coal, indeed to expand its share in total fuel, although the production costs of petroleum and gas (even when delivered to the customers) were much lower, while investment in the latter types of fuel were only negligibly larger. The de-

velopment of petroleum and especially gas was delayed for decades. The same is true of artificial fiber, synthetic leather and fat, and many other goods. Changes in all these respects occurred only recently.

Mismanagement

Only partly due to errors in pricing (and also in charges for transportation) are such absurd phenomena as shipment of round timber green, with all the waste and excessive water in it travelling over distances up to thousands of miles. The green timber is then cut at the destination point. Much timber and lumber is used green. This is particularly true of railway ties. The drying of timber, if it occurs at all, takes place frequently, if not always, in factories using the lumber, as for example in furniture factories and even in enterprises producing such relatively cheap items as peasants' horse wagons.

Examples of dictatorship in economic matters are the two hyroelectric plants at Kuibyshev and Stalingrad on the Volga, glorified as the "greatest in the world." Owing to the unsuitable (soft, to be specific) ground, the construction costs were huge. But this was ignored by the N.K.V.D. (M.V.D.) which drafted and directed these constructions. If this obvious fact was not considered, how could the N.K.V.D. be expected to pay attention to such a "minor" effect as damaging severely very valuable fishing grounds (the famous Russian black caviar comes from there)? Only after completion of the projects was it disclosed that the loss from fishing was not much smaller than the saving on fuel made possible by the greatly advertised constructions with their immense costs.¹¹

The Price

Some of those who see the rapid growth of Soviet industry may not be inclined to rate high the adverse effects of irrationalities and inefficiencies, because they fail to see how both phenomena can exist at the same time. Yet the economy is a very complicated phenomenon; it is a single body and all parts of this body must be included to obtain a correct picture.

The existence of great rates of growth and

¹⁰ *Agriculture USSR*, Statistical handbook, 1960, p. 117.

¹¹ All costly blunders committed by the N.K.V.D. (M.V.D.) in the construction of the Kuibyshev and Stalingrad electric stations cannot be discussed here. Several other constructions, effected by the N.K.V.D. (M.V.D.), which included the Volga-Don canal with the electric plant at Tsimlyanskaya, and the electric plant at Kakhovka, showed the same features.

Soviet National Income, 1928, 1952 and 1955
(in billion rubles at real 1926-1927 prices)

Item	1928	1952	1955
Total with some duplication	32.6	96.4	118.6
Administrative, M.V.D. and communal services	0.8	3.7	3.7
Armed forces, earmarked	0.8	20.6	23.3
Net investment	5.1	32.3	39.9
Personal incomes	24.3	31.4	39.9
Education and health services	1.6	8.4	11.8
Duplication	2.8	5.7	7.1
Total less duplication	29.8	90.7	111.5

* N.J., *Soviet Industrialization, 1928-52*, Appendix B, Table I. The data for 1928 at 1926-1927 prices are from official sources. The growth of each factor after 1928 was calculated at prices which seemed appropriate or available for the different portions of the whole period. The obtained percentage rises were applied to the data for the preceding period at 1926-1927 prices. Only the growth of national income as a whole was affected (boosted) by the use of 1926-1927 prices, because the share of the factors, notably those of investment and of the armed forces, which had expanded most during the period of the *Great Industrialization Drive*, were larger at 1926-1927 prices than at prices of the later years. I am sorry not to have given this explanation in the book itself.

great losses from irrationalities and inefficiencies is made possible by the price paid in the well-being of the population, allegedly so "dear" to the heart of the Khrushchevs. The rates of growth having been very large in the periods favorable for the Soviets (1934-1936 and post-world War II) and waste from poor quality, irrationalities and inefficiencies of the kinds having been very substantial, the price paid by the people had to have corresponding proportions.

Consumption levels of wage earners, especially peasants, were very low when the Great Industrialization Drive started in 1928. Yet measures to cut them drastically were taken almost at once upon the start of the Drive. It seems unbelievable but, according to calculations of this writer made as carefully as possible, real wages of hired labor and per capita real incomes of peasants declined to about one half by 1932. Such calculations cannot be exact, but the order of magnitude, it is hoped, is correct.

Since 1932, there were increases in real incomes, but also setbacks. On the average, all through the non-war years of the Stalin era real wages and per capita real incomes of the peasants were below two-thirds of those in 1927-1928. Especially for the

peasants a decided improvement did not start before the death of "the beloved leader." Not until 1958 did real wages and real incomes of the peasants roughly reach the pre-Industrialization Drive level.¹²

Great earthquake-like developments occurred during the period of the Great Industrialization Drive. The greatest of them all probably were the different rates at which the various components of national income rose and the changes in the proportions each component was of the total. National income increased by 274 per cent from 1928 to 1955, according to calculations of this writer (implied in the table above). Personal incomes grew by only 64 per cent, but the rest, which passed into the hands of State, was enlarged 13-fold. Correspondingly the share of personal incomes, which absorbed more than 80 per cent of the total national income in 1928, declined to little more than one third by 1955.¹³ The greatly varying rates of growth of the different factors during the period 1928-1952 are shown in the chart found in the beginning of this article. (See p. 293.)

It seems appropriate to relate waste to the gross "social product," as the Russians define this, rather than to national income. Avoidable waste in the economy may not be too large a percentage of the gross "social product." But national income is only about half of the latter.¹⁴ Since personal incomes constitute less than one half of national income (at 1937 prices), they amount to less than 25 per cent of the gross "social

¹² As far as real wages are concerned, the calculations of Mrs. Janet Chapman with use of 1928 weights in *Review of Economics and Statistics*, May, 1954, coincide almost exactly with those of this writer.

¹³ The increase in national income since 1928 was moderately less and the share of personal incomes in this income in 1955 was moderately higher, if the composition of 1928 national income is counted at say 1937 rather than 1926-1927 prices, used for the data in the Table above.

¹⁴ *Planned Economy*, 1961, No. 3, p. 5.

product." As compared with this, the waste in the Soviet economy looms huge. Even a partial removal of it would permit a great improvement in the well-being of the population, if used for this purpose.

Before this writer perceived the huge amount of waste in the Soviet economy, he believed that the rapid industrialization of the country required all the sacrifices in the well-being of the population. Now he sees that part of the sacrifices, and a substantial part, served to offset the great amount of waste. The possibility of eliminating part

of the waste in the Russian economy represents an additional reserve for future rapid economic growth, for increases in the well-being of the population, or for both. This may prevent a decline in rates of growth of industrial production in the future, a decline which otherwise could be expected with reasonable certainty. Continued low real incomes with considerably reduced waste in the economy would be dangerous for those against whom Khrushchev's "peace" policies are directed. Optimism, therefore, seems out of place.

(Continued from p. 272)

well to reconsider President Eisenhower's warning in his Farewell Address of January 17, 1961, against the acquisition of undue influence by the "military-industrial complex." (The U.S.S.R. has no privately owned arms industry operated for private profit.) And all humanity would be well advised to think anew about the words of the world's greatest living historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, in *A Study of History*: "Militarism has been by far the commonest cause of the breakdowns of civilizations during the past four or five millenia which have witnessed the score or so of breakdowns that are on record up to the present date. Militarism breaks a civilization down by causing the local States into which the society is articulated to collide with one another in destructive fratricidal conflicts. In this suicidal process the entire social fabric becomes fuel to feed the devouring flame in the brazen bosom of Moloch."

Epilogue

All of the preceding paragraphs were written in mid-summer of 1961. Events between mid-summer and the advent of autumn fully confirm the analysis set forth above. These events cannot be recounted here. Yet a few comments may be appropriate by way of suggesting how future historians (if any remain

alive) will probably evaluate the complex pattern of menace and counter-menace which in August, 1961, led, among other consequences, to the suspension of "disarmament negotiations" and to all-out resumption of the cold war and the arms race.

As usual in playing the game of power politics within the context of ethnocentric nationalism, the players obscured or concealed (sometimes even from themselves) their actual purposes and evoked patriotic support for their publicized purposes by misrepresenting the purposes of the "enemy."

To blame others is futile. To re-examine one's own purposes and motives is evidently impossible for the nation-states of a global civilization well along the road to final disaster. The end is not imminent. The Berlin "crisis" will doubtless be resolved by some negotiated formula of compromise. But the attitudes and policies which precipitated the crisis, if persisted in, bode ill for the future of mankind. "Disarmament" is dead. New departures are called for. Moscow, like Satan, is imaginative. Washington, thus far, is committed to the slogan: "Come weal, come woe, My status is Quo!"

What hope remains? None can say. Mankind still has a choice between coexistence and co-annihilation. The choice has not yet been made.

Current Documents

Text of the Third Draft Program of the C.P.S.U.

On July 30, 1960, the draft of the third party program of the Russian Communist party, to be presented to the Twenty-Second Party Congress in October, was published. It was translated by Tass (official Soviet news agency). Following the introduction, reprinted in full below, the program is divided into two parts. Part One,¹ entitled "The Transition from Capitalism to Communism Is the Road of Human Progress," ends with Section 8 on peaceful coexistence, also reprinted below in its entirety:

INTRODUCTION

The great October Socialist Revolution ushered in a new era in the history of mankind, the era of the downfall of capitalism and the establishment of communism. Socialism has triumphed in the Soviet Union and has achieved decisive victories in the people's democracies; socialism has become a cause of practical significance to hundreds of millions of people, and the bearer of the revolutionary movement of the working class throughout the world.

More than 100 years ago Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the great teachers of the proletariat, wrote in the "Communist Manifesto": "A specter is haunting Europe, the specter of communism." The courageous and selfless struggle of the proletariat of all countries brought mankind nearer to communism. First, dozens and hundreds of people, then thousands and millions, inspired by the ideals of communism, stormed the old world. The Paris Commune, the October Revolution, the Socialist revolution in China and in a number of European and Asian countries are the major historical stages in the heroic battle fought by the international working class for the victory of communism. A tremendously long road, a road drenched in the blood of fighters for the happiness of the people, a road of glorious victories and temporary reverses, had to be traversed before communism, which had once seemed

a mere specter, became the great force of modern times, a type of society that is being built up over vast areas of the globe.

In the early twentieth century the center of the international revolutionary movement shifted to Russia. Russia's heroic working class, led by the Bolshevik party headed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, became its vanguard. The Communist party inspired and led the Socialist revolution; it was the organizer and leader of the first workers' and peasants' state in history. The brilliant genius of Lenin, whose name will live forever, illumines mankind's road to communism.

On entering the arena of political struggle, the Leninist Communist party raised high the banner of revolutionary Marxism over the whole world. Marxism-Leninism became a powerful ideological weapon for the revolutionary transformation of society. At every stage of historical progress, the party, taking guidance from the theory of Marx-Engels-Lenin, accomplished the tasks scientifically formulated in its programs.

In adopting its first program at its Second Congress in 1903 the Bolshevik party called on the working class and all working people of Russia to fight for the overthrow of the czarist autocracy and then of the bourgeois-landlord system and for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In February, 1917, the czarist regime was swept away. In October, 1917, the proletarian revolution abolished the capitalist system so hated by the people. A Socialist country

¹ Part Two (not included here) discusses "The Tasks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Building a Communist Society."

came into being for the first time in history. The creation of a new world began.

The first program of the party had been carried out.

Adopting its second program at the Eighth Congress in 1919, the party promulgated the task of building a Socialist society. Treading on unexplored ground and overcoming difficulties and hardships, the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist party put into practice the plan for Socialist construction drawn up by Lenin. Socialism triumphed in the Soviet Union completely and finally.

The second program of the party has likewise been carried out.

The gigantic revolutionary exploits accomplished by the Soviet people roused and inspired the masses in all countries and continents. A mighty unifying thunderstorm marking the springtime of mankind is raging over the earth. The Socialist revolution in European and Asian countries has resulted in the establishment of the world Socialist system. A powerful wave of national liberation revolutions is sweeping away the colonial system of imperialism.

One-third of mankind is building a new life under the banner of scientific communism. The first contingents of the working class to shake off obsolete oppression are facilitating victory for fresh contingents of their class brothers. The Socialist world is expanding; the capitalist world is shrinking. Socialism will inevitably succeed capitalism everywhere. Such is the objective law of social development. Imperialism is powerless to check the irresistible process of emancipation.

Our effort, whose main content is the transition from capitalism to socialism, is an effort and struggle between the two opposing social systems, an effort of Socialist

and national liberation revolutions, of the breakdown of imperialism and the abolition of the colonial system, an effort of the transition of more and more people to the Socialist path, of the triumph of socialism and communism on a world-wide scale. The central factor of the present effort is the international working class and its main creation, the world Socialist system.

Today the Communist party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) is adopting its third program, a program for the building of Communist society. The new program is a constructive generalization of the experience of Socialist construction; it takes account of the revolutionary movement throughout the world and, giving expression to the collective opinion of the party, defines the main tasks and principal stages of Communist construction.

The supreme goal of the party is to build a Communist society on whose banner will be inscribed: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." The party's motto, "Everything in the name of man, for the benefit of man," will be put into effect in full.

The Communist party of the Soviet Union, true to proletariat internationalism, always follows the militant slogan, "Workers of all countries, unite!" The party regards Communist construction in the U.S.S.R. as the Soviet people's great internationalist task, in keeping with the interests of the world Socialist system as a whole, and with the interests of the international proletariat and all mankind.

Communism accomplishes the historic mission of delivering all men from social inequality, from every form of oppression and exploitation, from the horrors of war, and proclaims peace, labor, freedom, equality and happiness for all peoples of the earth.

8. PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR WORLD PEACE

The C.P.S.U. considers that the chief aim of its foreign policy activity is to provide peaceful conditions for the building of a Communist society in the U.S.S.R. and developing the world Socialist system and together with the other peace-loving peoples

to deliver mankind from a world war of extermination.

The C.P.S.U. maintains that forces capable of preserving and promoting world peace have arisen and are growing in the world. It is becoming possible to establish essentially new relations between states.

Imperialism knows no relations between states other than those of domination and subordination, of oppression of the weak by the strong. It bases international relations on diktat and intimidation, on violence and arbitrary rule. It regards wars of aggression as a natural means of settling international issues. For the imperialist countries, diplomacy has been, and remains, a tool for imposing their will upon other nations and preparing wars. At the time of the undivided rule of imperialism the issue of war and peace was settled by the finance and industrial oligarchy in the utmost secrecy from the peoples.

Socialism, in contrast to imperialism, advances a new type of international relations. The foreign policy of the Socialist countries, which is based on the principle of peace, the equality and self-determination of nations, and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries, as well as the fair, humane methods of Socialist diplomacy, are exerting a growing influence on the world situation. At a time when imperialism no longer plays a dominant role in international relations while the Socialist system is playing an increasing role, and when the influence of the countries that have won national independence and of the masses of the people in the capitalist countries has grown very considerably, it is becoming possible for the new principles advanced by socialism to gain the upper hand over the principles of aggressive imperialist policy.

For the first time in history, a situation has arisen in which not only the big states, but also the small ones, the countries which have chosen independent development, and all the states which want peace, are in a position, irrespective of their strength, to pursue an independent foreign policy.

The issue of war and peace is the principle issue of today. Imperialism is the only source of the war danger. The imperialist camp is making preparations for the worst crime against mankind—a world thermonuclear war that can bring unprecedented destruction to entire countries and wipe out entire nations. The problem of war and peace has become a life-and-death problem for hundreds of millions of people.

The peoples must concentrate their efforts on curbing the imperialists in good time and preventing them from making use of lethal weapons. The important thing is to ward off a thermonuclear war, not to let it break out. This can be done by the present generation.

The consolidation of the Soviet state and the formation of the world Socialist system were historic steps towards the realization of mankind's age-old dream of banishing wars from the life of society. In the Socialist part of the world there are no classes or social groups interested in starting a war. Socialism, outstripping capitalism in a number of important branches of science and technology, has supplied the peace-loving peoples with powerful material means of curbing imperialist aggression.

Capitalism established its rule with fire and sword, but socialism does not require war to spread its ideals. Its weapon is its superiority over the old system in social organization, political system, economy, the improvement of the standard of living and spiritual culture.

The Socialist system is a natural center of attraction for the peace-loving forces of the globe. The principles of its foreign policy are gaining ever greater international recognition and support. A vast peace zone has taken shape on earth. In addition to the Socialist countries, it includes a large group of non-Socialist countries that for various reasons are not interested in starting a war. The emergence of those countries in the arena of world politics has substantially altered the balance of forces in favor of peace.

There is a growing number of countries that adhere to a policy of neutrality and strive to safeguard themselves against the hazards of participation in the military blocs.

In the historical epoch the masses have a far greater opportunity of actively influencing the settlement of international issues. The peoples are taking the solution of the problem of war and peace into their own hands more and more vigorously. The anti-war movement of the masses, which takes various forms, is a major factor in the struggle for peace. The international working class, the most uncompromising and most consistent

fighter against imperialist war, is the great organizing force in this struggle of the people as a whole.

It is possible to avert a world war by the combined efforts of the mighty Socialist camp, the peace-loving non-Socialist countries, the international working class and all the forces championing peace. The growing superiority of the Socialist forces over the forces of imperialism, of the forces of peace over those of war, will make it actually possible to banish world war from the life of society even before the complete victory of socialism on earth, with capitalism surviving in a part of the world. The victory of socialism throughout the world will do away completely with the social and national causes of all wars. To abolish war and establish everlasting peace on earth is a historical mission of communism.

General and complete disarmament under strict international control is a radical way of guaranteeing a durable peace. Imperialism has imposed an unprecedented burden of armaments on the people. Socialism sees its duty towards mankind in delivering it from this absurd waste of national wealth. The solution of this problem would have historical significance for mankind. By an active and determined effort the peoples can and must force the imperialists into disarmament.

Socialism has offered mankind the only reasonable principle of maintaining relations between states at a time when the world is divided into two systems—the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, put forward by Lenin.

Peaceful coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist countries is an objective necessity for the development of human society. War cannot and must not serve as a means of settling international disputes. Peaceful coexistence or disastrous war—such is the alternative offered by history. Should the imperialist aggressors nevertheless venture to start a new world war, the peoples will no longer tolerate a system which drags them into devastating wars. They will sweep imperialism away and bury it.

Peaceful coexistence implies renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes, and their solution by negotiation; equality, mutual understanding and trust be-

tween countries; consideration of mutual interests; non-interference in internal affairs; recognition of the right of every people to solve all the problems of their country by themselves; strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; promotion of economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit.

Peaceful coexistence serves as a basis for the peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism on an international scale and constitutes a specific form of class struggle between them. As they consistently pursue the policy of peaceful coexistence, the Socialist countries are steadily strengthening the positions of the world Socialist system in its competition with capitalism. Peaceful coexistence affords more favorable opportunities for the struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries and facilitates the struggle of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries for their liberation.

Support for the principle of peaceful coexistence is also in keeping with the interests of that section of the bourgeoisie which realizes that a thermonuclear war would not spare the ruling classes of capitalist society either. The policy of peaceful coexistence is in accord with the vital interests of all mankind, except the big monopoly magnates and the militarists.

The Soviet Union has consistently pursued, and will continue to pursue, the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

The Communist party of the Soviet Union advances the following tasks in the field of international relations:

To use, together with the other Socialist countries, peaceful states and peoples every means of preventing war and providing conditions for the complete elimination of war from the life of society;

To pursue a policy of establishing sound international relations, and work for the disbandment of all military blocs opposing each other, the discontinuance of the "cold war" and the propaganda of enmity and hatred among the nations, and the abolition of all air, naval, rocket and other military bases on foreign territory;

To work for general and complete disarmament under strict international control;

To strengthen relations of fraternal friendship and close cooperation with the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America which are fighting to attain or consolidate national independence, with all peoples and states that advocate the preservation of peace;

To pursue an active and consistent policy of improving and developing relations with all capitalist countries, including the United States of America, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Italy, and other countries, with a view to safeguarding peace;

To contribute in every way to the militant solidarity of all contingents and organizations of the international working class, which oppose the imperialist policy of war;

Steadfastly to pursue a policy of consolidating all the forces fighting against war. All the organizations and parties that strive to avert war, the neutralist and pacifist movements and the bourgeois circles that advocate peace and normal relations between coun-

tries will meet with understanding and support on the part of the Soviet Union;

To pursue a policy of developing international cooperation in the fields of trade, cultural relations, science and technology;

To be highly vigilant with regard to the aggressive circles, which are intent on violating peace; to expose, in good time, the initiators of military adventures; to take all necessary steps to safeguard the security and inviolability of our Socialist country and the Socialist camp as a whole.

The C.P.S.U. and the Soviet people as a whole will continue to oppose all wars of conquest, including wars between capitalist countries, and local wars aimed at strangling people's emancipation movements, and consider it their duty to support the sacred struggle of the oppressed peoples and their just anti-imperialist wars of liberation.

The Communist party of the Soviet Union will hold high the banner of peace and friendship among the nations.

(Continued from p. 291)

farm system has been the elimination of the separate machine-tractor stations and sale of their farm machinery to the collectives. In this manner the overlapping, wasteful management of "two bosses on the land," as Khrushchev put it, was eliminated. On the whole this reform has worked well, though the problem of machinery repair, apparently, has not been satisfactorily solved. While much attention has been focused by the Soviet government on agricultural research and particularly on its practical application, the restoration of Lysenko to the presidency of the Lenin Academy of Agri-

cultural Sciences is not a happy augury.

To conclude, agriculture still poses serious problems for Soviet rulers, particularly those of weather, peasant morale and organizational structure. However, progress has been made since the bleak Stalin days; but it is much slower than called for by Soviet goals. The 70 per cent increase in agricultural production specified by the 7-year plan was over-optimistic. It is problematical whether the tempo of agricultural development can be greatly accelerated when expansion has to depend primarily on improvement of yields under Russian climatic conditions and regimented farm system.

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, JULY 2, 1946 AND JUNE 11, 1960 (74 STAT. 208) SHOWING THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION OF CURRENT HISTORY, published monthly at Philadelphia, Pa., for October, 1961.

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D. G. REDMOND, JR., Publisher

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 7th day of September, 1961. (Seal)

Mary K. O'Neill, Notary Public, Phila., Phila. Co. (My commission expires January 15, 1963.)

Received At Our Desk

Arms Control in the 1960's

BEFORE the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, there was unfortunately too little public interest in practical methods of arms control. This year, the spate of books on arms control and nuclear war¹ is symptomatic of a rather belated Western awareness and anxiety as the Russians rattle rockets and contaminate the atmosphere with fall-out from nuclear tests. A concerned public now has access to all but the classified material on disarmament and the possibilities of arms control.

Except for a small group of nuclear pacifists² who seem disinclined to face the very real possibility of nuclear war, United States specialists predicate their studies on three basic assumptions: that the United States will not start an all-out nuclear war, i.e., that we shall not "strike first" against the Soviet Union; that on the other hand the Soviet Union may "strike first," starting an all-out nuclear war, if it believes it can escape without irreparable damage; that if

attacked the United States will fight back, therefore needing a "second strike" nuclear capacity.

The series of studies originally published by *Daedalus* in the fall of 1960 still provides the most comprehensive, detailed and painstaking information in this general field. Recently published in hard cover under the title *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security*, the original text was enlarged and brought up to date; five new papers were added. As Jerome B. Weisner points out in the Foreword, "Obviously the most important task confronting us today is to find the means of halting the arms race and eliminating the danger of nuclear war. . . . Like it or not, the nations of the world must make a superhuman effort, working together, to reach agreements leading to some form of rational system of world security."

Within the scope of this book, "'arms control' is a generic term that includes the possibility of literal 'disarmament' among other possible cases." Goals and basic requirements of arms control are lucidly analyzed; inspection techniques are explored;

¹ See also the review of Arthur Hadley's *The Nation's Safety and Arms Control*, appearing below.

² This term is used by Edgar Ansel Mowrer to distinguish religious pacifists from those who have become pacifists because of revulsion against the enormous scale of killings in the event of nuclear war.

Bechhoefer, Bernhard G. *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control*. (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1961. 598 pages, bibliographical guide and index, \$8.75.)

Brennan, Donald G., editor, with the sponsorship of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security*. (New York: George Braziller, 1961. 456 pages, references, notes on contributors, \$6.00.)

Cerf, Jay H. and Pozen, Walter. *Strategy for the 60's*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961. 155 pages, \$1.50.)

Finletter, Thomas K. *Foreign Policy: The Next Phase. The 1960's*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960. 227 pages and index, \$4.00.)

Hammond, Paul Y. *Organizing for Defense. The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. 391 pages and index, \$8.50.)

Henkin, Louis, editor. *Arms Control. Issues for*

the Public. A Publication of the American Assembly. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961. 204 pages, \$3.50.)

Mowrer, Edgar Ansel. *An End to Make-Believe*. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961. 219 pages, bibliography and index, \$3.95.)

Schelling, Thomas C. and Halperin, Morton H. *Strategy and Arms Control*. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961. 143 pages and appendix, \$2.50.)

Snyder, Glenn H. *Deterrence and Defense. Toward a Theory of National Security*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. 289 pages and index, \$6.50.)

Sokol, Anthony. *Sea Power in the Nuclear Age*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961. 248 pages, references, bibliography and index, \$6.00.)

Warburg, James P. *Disarmament: The Challenge of the Nineteen Sixties*. (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1961. 212 pages and appendix, \$4.50.)

the economic implications of arms control are summarized. The problems of negotiation with other powers; of making American policy decisions; of setting up world security arrangements are included in this study. The editors suggest 10 of the 23 chapters as a "short-course"; this reviewer urges that the reader work his way through the whole of this excellent but discouraging volume. The contributing authors, among whom are Herman Kahn, Bernard Bechhoefer, Morton Halperin, Thomas Schelling, Louis B. Sohn, Kenneth Boulding and others, have continued to study the possibility of avoiding nuclear catastrophe or minimizing its effects.

A briefer symposium, *Arms Control: Issues for the Public*, grew out of the Nineteenth American Assembly study and is a collection of its discussion papers "designed for the intelligent layman." William Frye's brief summary of "The Quest for Disarmament Since World War II" provides excellent review. James King's discussion of arms control and United States security is balanced by a revealing analysis of the Soviet national interest by Malcolm Mackintosh and Harry Willetts. European views on arms control are summarized. Available in a paperback edition (\$1.95), this short volume is based on the assumption that "Without access to classified information, without special training in science or weaponry or military strategy, the citizen can be informed and can understand the issues which determine the arms policies of the United States, the prospects and the probabilities of disarmament. It is the purpose of this volume to help the public toward this understanding. . . ." In this undertaking the authors of this symposium share the credit for a very large measure of success.

At greater length, the interested reader can profit from Bernhard G. Bechhoefer's analysis of *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control*. The author divides his study into five periods; United Nations negotiations, 1946-1948; frustration, 1948-1951; comprehensive disarmament proposals, 1952-1954; searching for partial disarmament, 1955-1957; negotiations 1958-1960. "The arms control negotiations have truly been a highway without signs," this author comments, raising the fundamental question

"Does arms control . . . in fact lead to peace or to security?" Although it is difficult to trace the course of arms control negotiations since 1945, the author concludes that "in general the direction of the highway of arms control negotiations has been toward increasing accord." What will be required, in all probability, will be "extended and patient negotiations lasting for years."

Not nearly so optimistic of the future of arms control is James P. Warburg, in *Disarmament: The Challenge of the 1960's*. Warburg advocates "universal national disarmament under adequately enforced world law as the most promising method of ensuring the survival of human civilization," and calls attention to the work accomplished in this field by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn. He feels that nuclear war, not aggressive communism, is the greatest threat to our civilization; he distinguishes between the two dangers; he is sharply critical of the United States policy of containment and he fears accident far more than a Soviet military adventure. Arms control and disarmament are in fact clearly different; Warburg would not be critical "If the various proposals relating to arms control were put forward not as alternatives to universal disarmament but as steps toward its achievement—as devices to halt the insane arms race and to provide time in which a universal consensus concerning the need for the abolition of war could be arrived at." On the contrary, however, most arms control suggestions "have been presented in the context of an assumed unavoidable continuation of the 'war system'. . . ."

This is not true of many advocates of arms control who want to gain time to negotiate for disarmament. Some writers, however, are more conscious of the military and strategic aspects of arms control. In a group of studies prepared by 13 foreign policy research centers for the United States Senate, and edited under the title *Strategy for the 60's*, arms control analysis appears in a study of "The Military Challenge: Deterrence, Defense, and Arms Control." A summary analysis notes: "The Johns Hopkins study suggests that arms control is really one of several aspects of America's national security strategy aimed at maximizing its military security in the nuclear age." In

addition to the summary analysis, outlines of each of the 13 reports are offered.

In their study of *Strategy and Arms Control*, Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin also join those who view the problems of adequate arms control as part of the general military policy of the nation. "What is striking is not how novel the methods and purposes of arms control are, and how different from the methods and purposes of national military policy; what is striking is how much overlap there is."

As these authors view history, "Conflict of interest is a social phenomenon unlikely to disappear, and potential recourse to violence and damage will always suggest itself if the conflict gets out of hand. Man's capability for self-destruction cannot be eradicated—he knows too much. Keeping that capability under control . . . is the eternal challenge. This is the objective of responsible military policy. And a conscious adjustment of our military forces and policies to take account of those of our potential enemies, in the common interest of restraining violence, is what we mean by arms control." The relationship between arms control and the strategic problems of military policy provides the central theme of this book.

Another study predicated "On the assumption that war is always a possibility in international relations" is *Seapower in the Nuclear Age*, by Anthony E. Sokol. Since the possibility of war exists, "We cannot abolish this possibility simply by denying its existence. . . ." The role of sea power in defense of Western civilization and its role in Soviet thinking are analyzed; the background of sea power and its definition, the elements of sea power and the strategy of sea power are included. The author underlines the theory that stronger conventional military capability is necessary and that sea power will offer mobility.

Pacifists and those who put their faith in military deterrence and defense may join in a desire to guarantee civilian control of the United States military establishment. In his study *Organizing for Defense*, Paul Y. Hammond outlines the organization of the United States military establishment from 1900 to the present, including some suggestions to improve the organization of the varied agencies handling military policy.

Glenn H. Snyder's *Deterrence and Defense* also highlights primarily military problems. Readers who are interested in the strategy of military deterrence may be interested in this rather theoretical account (with mathematical formulas) of the differences between a deterrent nuclear force, a defensive force and the problems of choosing between these elements. The basic assumption of the study is that the arms race and the balance of terror—or imbalance of terror—will continue indefinitely, and that all-out nuclear war may occur.

Scarcely more cheerful is Thomas K. Finletter, in *Foreign Policy: The Next Phase*. He too believes that "We have to think of the possibility of a deliberate war by our opponents." Because of this possibility, "Nothing is more important for us than to make such a deliberate attack as unlikely as possible. This we call our deterrent policy." Because the United States will not "strike first," it may be effectively disarmed by a surprise attack; for this reason the "atomic stalemate idea is wrong and dangerous," with its implications that war is unthinkable. This is a double barreled plea: for a deterrent build up so that we can keep the Russians from attacking and in this way buy time; for a vigorous United States push toward a disarmament plan.

Edgar Ansel Mowrer, asking for *An End to Make-Believe*, repeats the warning that "Saying that war was 'unthinkable' conceivably made it more likely than considering it highly probable and drawing the necessary conclusions." Regarding the Communists as implacable belligerent enemies of the rest of the world, Mowrer calls for a community of all the free nations. Popular in style and highly emotional, this is a polemic rather than an analysis of the cold war.

All these books are worth thought and study; the problems of disarmament, arms control, deterrence and general military policy are obviously interrelated. Those who are taking a long, hard look at the possibilities of nuclear war in the 1960's are trying to avoid war or minimize its awful effects; those who refuse to face the possibility will not make it go away.

C. L. T.

* * *

History and Politics . . .

THE NATION'S SAFETY AND ARMS CONTROL. BY ARTHUR T. HADLEY. (New York: The Viking Press, 1961. 160 pages, glossary and bibliography, \$3.00.)

Disarmament discussions have received more public attention than perhaps any other single issue of the cold war. The reaction of the American public to the baffling, and often contradictory, array of disarmament proposals has fluctuated between great expectation and deep-rooted apathy. As a result of the failure of the executive branch of government to inform and educate adequately on the complexities of contemporary world problems, the public mood has been described as a mixture of fantasy and fatalism. The fundamental lack of official interest in disarmament until 1959 intensified the already cynical popular attitude toward disarmament, and related questions.

Though disarmament is still dead as a realizable objective, there has recently developed a sincere and widespread official interest in a system of arms control. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have reasons to favor a reduction of the proliferating arsenal of nuclear weapons. As Arthur Hadley makes clear in his remarkably astute and illuminating book, each Great Power has the ability to destroy the other. "The 55-kilomegatons in the combined United States-Soviet stockpiles are an incalculable amount of destruction. If both sides were ever able to fire all their weapons at each other . . . the result would be over ninety per cent population destruction in both countries." A grim fact of today's world.

The author makes clear that arms control is not a substitute for disarmament. It is an integral part of national defense. For those who argue that arms control plans are unworkable and help "weaken the moral resolve of the West to fight if necessary," the author answers that "not to consider arms control for fear the discussion will undermine the nation's resolve is to attribute to the United States a determination to suffer for its ideals of mouselike proportions."

Arthur Hadley has written an important book. Lively, clearly written, and replete with factual accounts of how near and frequently we have come to an "On the Beach" type solution to man's problems, it accurately analyzes the dilemmas confronting our leaders. It introduces the reader to the pitfalls and promises of arms control. Hadley effectively debunks the role of the "deterrent" force; he notes the "extreme vulnerability of SAC's missiles and planes to Russian attack," observing that this could conceivably encourage the Soviets to try a sudden knock-out blow, the exact opposite of what SAC is supposed to accomplish.

To achieve a viable arms control plan, he maintains that the United States must a) develop a deterrent which, in fact, deters by virtue of its overwhelming capacity for retaliation and b) expand its ability to fight limited, non-nuclear wars. These are expensive propositions. They have been suggested many times before. Yet, there is insufficient action or accomplishment to date to indicate that the Congress or the Executive have taken these warnings to heart.

A. Z. R.

SOVIET INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1928-1952. BY NAUM JASNY. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. 467 pages, appendices and index, \$10.00.)

In this interesting and well-written study of Soviet economic development over a quarter of a century, Naum Jasny elaborates on Soviet gains and failures. It was under Stalin's leadership after the second world war that Soviet industrialization moved ahead tremendously. As the author writes: "The speed of expansion seems almost miraculous until all factors are considered." Industrial recovery was initiated ". . . at high rates, while the population was starving and so many were dying of starvation that deaths greatly exceeded births."

How was such expansion possible? State investment after the war was very large "relative to total economic power. It has been established that the Soviet economy, with its high investment quota and low personal incomes, is geared to rapid expansion rates, if those in power

do not embark on such growth-retarding actions as the violent *All-out Drive* of the early 1930's or the *Purge Era* of the late 1930's." From 1945 to 1952, "*The Stalin Has Everything His Way* period displayed the aforesaid feature of the Soviet economy to the highest degree; moreover, it profited from the *Purge Era*. Utilization of capacities declined considerably during the *Purge Era*, and the expansion in the postwar Stalin period consisted in part in the utilization of capacities dormant in 1940."

Jasny concludes that Soviet economic growth (in the 12 years from 1940 to 1952 national income rose more than 50 per cent) seemed "a favorable picture, except for the price of this growth: the greatly disorganized agriculture and the very low level of incomes of wage and salary earners, and especially those of the peasants, at the end of the successful period."

Thus, in the final analysis, what made possible this "super-rapid industrialization" was "the drastic exploitation of the whole population. . . . While there has been a substantial improvement in personal incomes since Stalin's death, real wages did not regain their 1928 level until 1958. Peasants' per capita real incomes were still below that level in 1958, according to the calculations of the writer. The margin of error in these calculations is small as compared with the improvement in real wages and per capita real incomes of the peasants, which would have occurred under any regime but the communist dictatorship during the thirty-year period."

As for the future, Jasny observes that under Khrushchev the tremendous sacrifices of the population are continuing to provide the basis of a dynamic economy.

T. H. B.

THE DYNAMICS OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE. By R. V. BURKS. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. 244 pages appendices, glossary, and index, \$5.00.)

"This study is concerned with the nature of the Communist movement in eastern Europe. It is an attempt to discover

whether in fact Communism in eastern Europe is, in any real sense, a proletarian movement, whether Marxism explains why there are Communists in that part of the world. For evidence we shall examine, not what east European Communists say about themselves and their followers, but the raw data of Communist social composition."

Burks notes that the hard-core activists of the Communist parties "insofar as they have not been formally trained as lawyers, teachers, and engineers, may be regarded as self-tutored professionals who have used the party to climb into the ranks of the middle class." They are not, contrary to Communist assertions, of proletarian origin. In eastern Europe, which is largely agrarian in character, the bulk of Communist electoral support and guerrilla recruits come from the peasantry.

In the second half of the book, the author analyzes the significance of ethnic groups in the makeup of Communist parties. He suggests that there are certain features common to various Communist parties and that "it is possible to classify them according to type. There are sectarian or deviational parties, mass proletarian parties, and national, anti-Western parties."

The sectarian party is found primarily in the industrialized countries of the West. "It is made up essentially of middle class neurotics and ethnic outcasts. It is minuscule in size and has almost no influence. . . ." "The second type of party, the mass proletarian, is found in Western countries where industrialization has gone far but has failed to produce living standards equal to those prevailing in the most advanced industrial countries. In these semi-affluent Western countries a situationally damaged urban proletariat has an interest in drastic reform. . . ." And, finally, the third type of party flourishes in the backward, underdeveloped countries. Its leaders come from the frustrated, disillusioned members of the middle class and intelligensia.

"Communism in eastern Europe has many causes, but the notion that it represents, or is led by, the suffering proletariat is largely fictional. A. Z. R.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Belgrade Conference

Sept. 1—The conference of unaligned nations opens in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Yugoslav President Tito gives the opening address. President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the U.A.R. denounces the Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing and calls for a summit conference to maintain world peace.

Sept. 2—Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru calls for "a peace treaty for complete and general disarmament" in response to Soviet renewal of nuclear testing.

Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado asks conferees to condemn U.S. imperialism in Latin America.

Sept. 5—The conference of 25 delegations ends. An appeal is issued to the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. to end the arms race and nuclear tests and to negotiate a world peace. A second statement issued by the conference calls for the participation of non-aligned countries in a world disarmament conference and for their increased participation in U.N. affairs.

Sept. 6—Prime Minister Nehru of India and Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah present to Khrushchev in Moscow a letter from the Belgrade conference. The letter urges Khrushchev to meet with U.S. President Kennedy to negotiate a settlement of problems creating world tensions, such as Berlin.

Berlin Crisis

Sept. 1—In answer to a Soviet note of August 24 claiming that Western air routes to West Berlin were provided on a temporary basis only, the U.S. State Department publishes a 14-year old secret document to prove Russia's commitment to give the Allied powers unrestricted access to West Berlin.

Sept. 2—Communist East Germany announces that it has protested against the transfer last month of 1,500 U.S. soldiers to West Berlin.

Sept. 3—The Soviet Union's notes to the Western powers, delivered yesterday, is published, in which the Soviet Union declares that there are limitations on civilian air traffic to West Berlin over the 3 Allied air corridors.

Sept. 5—French President Charles de Gaulle declares that the West must resist Soviet infringement of its rights in Berlin forcibly if necessary.

Sept. 8—Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev declares that a peace treaty must be signed with East Germany shortly. He also says that he is willing to meet with U.S. President John F. Kennedy to discuss "pressing international problems."

In notes to the U.S.S.R., Britain, France and the U.S. declare that any alteration of the Berlin situation will be interpreted as an "aggressive action." The Allies reaffirm their right to "unrestricted" use of the air routes to West Berlin.

Sept. 9—Khrushchev, in a message to President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, declares the U.S.S.R. will halt nuclear tests only when the West accepts its proposals for Berlin and Germany, and for a general disarmament program.

Sept. 11—A Soviet note to the U.S., Britain and France declares that all foreigners wishing entrance to East Germany or East Berlin must apply to the East German government.

Sept. 21—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko talks with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk for two hours in New York.

Sept. 23—General Lucius D. Clay, Kennedy's personal representative in Berlin, declares that the U.S. still supports German unification.

Sept. 24—President Luecke tells West Germans that they can trust Allied assurances that they will not allow the freedom of West Berlin to be undermined.

Sept. 27—The Bonn government announces that U.S. Ambassador Walter C. Dowling has re-assured West Germany that the U.S. determination to maintain West Berlin's freedom remains as firm as ever.

Sept. 28—Britain's Lord Home meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York to discuss the Berlin situation.

Disarmament

Sept. 1—The Soviet Union resumes nuclear testing with an atomic explosion in the atmosphere over Central Asia.

Sept. 3—U.S. President John F. Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan suggest to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev that all 3 governments agree to refrain from nuclear tests in the atmosphere that produce fall-out.

Sept. 5—The Soviet press agency Tass scoffs at the Kennedy-Macmillan suggestion of a test ban.

Kennedy orders the resumption of U.S. nuclear tests "in the laboratory and underground, with no fall-out."

Sept. 6—The Soviet Union and the U.S. begin a new series of discussions on disarmament.

The Vatican radio asks for the renunciation of nuclear tests.

Sept. 9—Khrushchev says that there can be no nuclear test ban until a German peace treaty is concluded and general disarmament takes place.

At Geneva, the U.S., Britain and Russia recess nuclear test ban negotiations. Kennedy and Macmillan express "deepest regret" at Khrushchev's refusal to join a nuclear test ban.

Sept. 20—The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agree on very general disarmament principles, they report to the U.N. General Assembly.

Sept. 24—The U.S.S.R. maintains that a 3-nation executive (a troika) must head an international disarmament control organization.

Sept. 28—Britain and the U.S. ask the General Assembly to support a nuclear test ban treaty with effective controls.

Orthodox Church Conference

Sept. 24—The first meeting of the Eastern Orthodox Church in 12 centuries gathers in Rhodes, Greece. The Orthodox Church's last Council was Nicaea in 787.

United Nations

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*, Sept. 25.)

Sept. 15—A French official criticizes U.N. forcible intervention in Katanga. (See

also *Republic of the Congo, Leopoldville*.)

Sept. 17—The Western powers suggest that the question of the admission of Communist China to the U.N. be added to the General Assembly agenda.

Sept. 18—Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld is killed in a plane crash in Northern Rhodesia. Hammarskjöld was en route to a meeting with Katangan President Moise Tshombe.

Sept. 19—The 16th session of the General Assembly opens; after a tribute to Dag Hammarskjöld the meeting adjourns.

The U.S.S.R. asks the U.N. to recognize that Communist China should have the Chinese seat in the U.N.

The U.S.S.R. suggests that the General Assembly move U.N. headquarters from New York to West Berlin.

Sept. 20—Mongi Slim of Tunisia is elected General Assembly president by a vote of 96-0 with one abstention.

Sept. 21—The General Assembly's Steering Committee accepts a British-American suggestion that a nuclear test ban treaty under international control should be discussed.

Sept. 25—The U.S. suggests a detailed disarmament plan to the General Assembly. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

The Assembly agrees to debate the U.N. seating of Red China.

Sept. 26—The U.S.S.R. suggests that four Under Secretaries should be appointed to share the responsibilities of the Secretary General; one of the four would be elected chairman by the others.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko tells the General Assembly that the problem of Germany overshadows all other issues. (See also *International, Berlin Crisis*.)

Sept. 27—Sierra Leone is admitted as the 100th member of the U.N.

Warsaw Pact

Sept. 9—Tass (official Soviet news agency) announces that at a 2-day meeting of the 8 Warsaw Pact countries, it has been agreed to increase Communist bloc defenses because of an increased Nato build-up.

Sept. 25—The Warsaw Pact nations announce training maneuvers for their troops will be held in October and November.

West Europe

Sept. 7—U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman reports from Brussels that the European Economic Commission (Common Market) agrees there is a need for specific understandings on imports from the U.S.

Sept. 19—The European Parliamentary Assembly approves Greek association with the Common Market; a customs union will develop into an economic union after a 12-22 year transition period.

Sept. 20—Meeting in Vienna, West European finance ministers agree to lend currencies to the International Monetary Fund in case of a monetary crisis.

ARGENTINA

Sept. 26—President Arturo Frondizi of Argentina confers in Washington with U.S. President Kennedy for 4 hours.

AUSTRIA

Sept. 12—Italy formally protests to Austria over terroristic acts by persons demanding autonomy for the German-speaking populace of Alto Adige province (formerly Austrian South Tyrol).

BELGIUM

Sept. 18—Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak arrives in Moscow for a private visit with Premier Khrushchev.

Ruanda-Urundi

Sept. 20—Final returns of the election, held 2 days ago in Urundi for the new 64-member parliament, are announced: the Union and Progress National party wins 58 seats in the contest with the opposition Christian Democrat party.

Sept. 26—It is reported that the votes counted so far (over half) in the Ruanda election reveal that the people rejected overwhelmingly the return of the monarchy headed by King Kigeri V.

BOLIVIA

Sept. 19—The Congress refuses to accept the resignation of Vice-President Juan Lechin Oguendo for the second time. Last week Lechin first tried to resign because of charges by Salto Province's Vice Governor that he was the head of a cocaine producing operation.

BRAZIL

Sept. 1—Vice-President João Goulart flies secretly to Brazil to claim the presidency vacated by Janio Quadros a week ago. Goulart's succession is opposed by the ranking 3 Brazilian military leaders, who suspect him of Communist leanings.

Sept. 2—Both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate approve a constitutional amendment to facilitate Goulart's succession. The amendment provides for a parliamentary form of government with a figurehead president and governmental powers vested in a premier.

Sept. 3—Brazil's 3 top military chiefs agree to accept Goulart as president under the revised constitution.

Sept. 7—Goulart is sworn in as President. He nominates Federal Deputy Tancredo Neves for the premiership.

Sept. 8—The Congress accepts Premier Neves and his coalition cabinet. The 3 military leaders, ministers of the Navy, Air Force and War, who opposed Goulart, are replaced.

Sept. 28—Premier Neves presents a program to promote industrial development and financial stability.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Australia

Sept. 27—Prime Minister Robert Menzies reveals that Australia and the U.S. have agreed to cooperate in space research.

Canada

Sept. 7—Prime Minister John Diefenbaker says Canada plans to increase the number in her armed forces from 120,000 to 135,000 so that the Canadian contribution to Nato can be increased from 12,000 to 14,000.

Ghana

Sept. 5—Strikes and demonstrations start in opposition to President Kwame Nkrumah's austerity program.

Sept. 9—A limited state of emergency is declared in Sekondi Takoradi, focal point of the strike movement.

Sept. 17—Emergency measures are lifted.

Sept. 22—The strike against the austerity program ends.

Nkrumah takes charge of Ghana's armed forces.

Sept. 25—The Moscow radio reveals that the U.S.S.R. will aid Ghana's Volta River project.

Sept. 28—A presidential statement reveals that six ministers and junior ministers have been asked to resign because of their personal business interests. Minister of Health K. A. Gbedemah, generally regarded as a moderate, is included.

Sept. 30—Four new Cabinet ministers are named; all are considered strong advocates of nationalization and socialization of Ghana's industry.

Great Britain

Sept. 3—The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament organizes a 5,000-man protest march in central London against Russian resumption of nuclear tests.

Sept. 12—Philosopher Bertrand Russell is sentenced to seven days in jail for refusing to abstain from a sitdown demonstration against nuclear arms.

Sept. 13—The government forbids a mass rally against nuclear arms planned by the Committee of 100.

Sept. 18—1,140 demonstrators are arrested as they attempt to stage a mass sitdown protest against nuclear arms in Trafalgar Square.

Sept. 20—A one-day national teachers' strike protests government cutbacks in salary increases.

Sept. 25—Queen Elizabeth II convokes the seventh Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference in London.

Sept. 26—Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Duncan Sandys tells the Commonwealth Conference that unless "vital Commonwealth interests" are safeguarded Britain will not join the Common Market.

India

Sept. 25—The Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a government effort to rule on the prices and the number of pages in daily newspapers.

Pakistan

Sept. 6—Afghanistan ends diplomatic relations with Pakistan, in a border dispute.

Sept. 22—It is officially announced that

fundamentals of a new constitution for Pakistan will be revealed in November.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Sept. 12—African nationalist leader Hastings K. Banda is sworn in as Minister of National Resources in Nyasaland.

Sept. 15—Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Federation, asks for restoration of the Tshombe Government and a cease fire in Katanga. (See also *Republic of the Congo*.)

Kenya

Sept. 4—Governor Sir Patrick Renison opens discussions on a new constitution with politicians in Nairobi.

Sept. 7—The Kenya African National Union delegation leaves the constitutional conference in anger.

Uganda

Sept. 18—British Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod asks Uganda's political leaders to reconcile their differences, as he opens a constitutional conference.

West Indies Federation

Sept. 19—Almost complete returns in a Jamaica referendum reveal that Jamaica votes to withdraw from the West Indian Federation.

Sept. 21—British Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod opens conferences with Lord Hailes, Governor General of the West Indies Federation, on the future of the West Indies Federation without Jamaica.

Sept. 22—Jamaican Prime Minister Norman Manley resigns the presidency of the West Indies Federal Labor party.

Sept. 24—Norman Manley says he has no plans to resign as Prime Minister of Jamaica because of the referendum in which it was decided that Jamaica would withdraw from the Federation.

CAMBODIA

Sept. 6—The Cambodian army reports that it has ousted Viet Cong rebels from South Vietnam.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Sept. 30—Premier Chou En-lai criticizes U.S. hostility to Red China and declares that the Chinese people are "consistently devoted to the defense of world peace."

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Sept. 1—The U.N. mission in Elisabethville announces the discontinuance of relations, except for the absolute minimum necessary, with President Moise Tshombe's secessionist regime in Katanga Province. The U.N. mission charges that Katanga's Interior Minister Godefroid Munongo is responsible for a "murderous conspiracy" against the U.N.

Sept. 2—U.N. Secretary Dag Hammarskjold announces the appointment of Tunisian Mahmoud Khiari as chief of civilian operations in the Congo and of Ghanaian Brigadier Joseph Michel as chief of staff of the U.N. force there.

Sept. 6—Tshombe receives a vote of confidence on his secessionist policy from the Katanga National Assembly.

It is disclosed that 38 Belgian officers are leaving Katanga, making a total of 250 Belgian officers from Katanga who have left in the last month.

Sept. 12—Tshombe refuses to meet in Leopoldville with U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, and invites Hammarskjold to visit Katanga.

Sept. 13—U.N. forces in the Congo engage in heavy fighting with Katanga soldiers to end that province's secession. Chief U.N. representative to the Congo Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien declares that the offensive operation was enacted at the request of the central government and that the U.N. acted to avoid civil war in the Congo. He declares that Katanga is under central government rule, and is no longer a secessionist province.

U.N. Secretary General Hammarskjold arrives in Leopoldville.

Sept. 14—Katanga troops renew intensive fighting in a counter-attack against U.N. forces. Tshombe declares he is willing to negotiate a cease-fire.

In a report by Dr. Sture C. Linner, head of the U.N. mission to the Congo, it is disclosed that U.N. forces attacked Katanga after Katanga rejected a U.N. demand to remove all foreign officers from Katanga's army.

Sept. 15—U.N. and Katanga troops continue battling.

Sept. 16—The U.S. State Department issues a statement urging the "rapid conclusion" of warfare in the Congo and an early resumption of peace talks.

Sept. 18—Some 158 Irish troops under the U.N. surrender to Katanga soldiers at Jadotville in Katanga Province, after holding out for five days at their post.

Hammarskjold and his staff are killed in an airplane crash en route to meet with Tshombe at Ndola in Northern Rhodesia.

Sept. 19—Peace talks between the U.N. and Katanga open in Ndola. Mahmoud Khiari negotiates in place of Hammarskjold.

Sept. 20—Katanga and U.N. representatives agree on a provisional cease-fire ending Katanga fighting.

Sept. 24—It is reported that Stanleyville leader Antoine Gizenga has accepted the post of vice-premier in Premier Cyrille Adoula's central government.

Sept. 27—Tshombe asks Adoula to meet with him on neutral soil.

Sept. 28—A U.N. official declares that the U.N. has given Tshombe "a matter of days" to remove 100 white mercenaries from the Katanga army.

Baluba tribesmen and Katangans clash at Kipushi, 15 miles from Elisabethville.

CUBA

Sept. 10—Some 4,000 Cubans demonstrating against the government in Havana are forced to break up by machine gun fire from militia and soldiers. The crowd gathered to protest the cancellation of a church procession, because the government refused to allow it to be held in the afternoon.

Sept. 12—An Interior Ministry communiqué charges the Roman Catholic Church in Cuba with counter-revolutionary activity against the Castro government.

Sept. 14—The air tickets of 15,000 Cubans en route to the U.S. are cancelled. The system for obtaining seats on outgoing airplane flights and permission to leave is revised.

Sept. 16—It is reported that some 100 Catholic priests have been arrested by the government.

Sept. 17—Some 135 Catholic priests are ex-

pelled from Cuba and forced aboard a Spanish ship, including Bishop Eduardo Boza Masvidal. The Bishop was pastor of the Church of Charity, where the large protest demonstration took place a week ago.

About 176 persons are arrested after a demonstration breaks out during a religious procession.

Sept. 20—Pope John XXIII denounces the purge of a Catholic Bishop and priests from Cuba.

Sept. 23—Five Cubans are executed by firing squad for participating in the invasion last April. A revolutionary court sentences 63 persons to prison terms from 9 to 30 years.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Sept. 12—Government troops and tanks patrol the streets of Ciudad Trujillo following street rioting. The riot was sparked by the arrival of a 4-man O.A.S. committee investigating whether the Dominican Republic is easing its dictatorship.

Sept. 13—Thousands of Dominicans, in defiance of a government order, join a funeral procession for one of the 4 persons killed in yesterday's outburst.

Sept. 17—Some 10,000 persons gather to protest against the government of President Joaquin Balaguer. The demonstrators urge the O.A.S. to maintain its sanctions against the Dominican Republic.

Sept. 21—Balaguer invites delegates from the opposition political parties to the Presidential Palace to discuss the creation of a coalition government in an effort to introduce some elements of democratic government.

FRANCE (See also *Tunisia*.)

Sept. 1—Two farm organizations protest President Charles de Gaulle's statement that a special session of Parliament could discuss but not legislate on agricultural problems. The session was called to enact some price increases.

Sept. 9—It is announced today that an attack on de Gaulle's life was attempted yesterday when an explosive near his car misfired.

Sept. 12—French Deputies from all parties walk out of the Assembly's special session

to protest limitations on debate.

Sept. 15—The Constitutional Council refuses to rule on the validity of a motion of censure against Premier Michel Debré presented in the Assembly earlier this week.

Sept. 19—Speaker of the National Assembly Jacques Chaban-Delmas tells the Deputies that they must wait until the regular parliamentary session convening October 3 to introduce a motion of censure against the government, following the decision of the Constitutional Council.

Sept. 20—De Gaulle announces that he will give up the special emergency powers he has held since last April. The Cabinet announces a decision to raise milk prices by 8 per cent (making milk 8¢ a quart) to meet the demands of farm organizations. Finance Minister Wilfrid Baumgartner opposed the increase.

Sept. 26—Meeting with delegates of the French Socialist party, de Gaulle declares that talks with Algerian rebel nationalists will be resumed shortly.

French Community in Africa

Sept. 13—The 12 states of the French Community issue a declaration after a 10-day meeting urging that all African nations share in the resources of the Sahara. The conference also hopes for a resumption of peace talks between Algerian nationalists and French officials.

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Algeria

Sept. 5—At a news conference, President de Gaulle declares that he is willing to yield sovereignty over the Sahara to an independent Algeria that will cooperate with France.

French rightists in Algeria detonate the largest explosion to date, at a port at Algiers, to protest the de Gaulle statement.

Sept. 6—Major General Jacques Massu, a leader of the May, 1958, revolt in Algeria, is given a position as military governor of Metz after being on the inactive list for 19 months.

Sept. 28—Rioting by 300 European youths in Algiers is broken up by police.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (EAST)

Sept. 7—Following yesterday's decision by workers in the People's Own Electro-carbon Factory in East Berlin to raise production by 24 per cent, workers in other factories volunteer to "produce more in the same time for the same pay."

Sept. 17—East Germans vote for a single list of Communist candidates for municipal and county councils.

Sept. 20—The *Volkskammer* (People's Chamber) approves a law enabling the government to act in case of a "national defense emergency." In an emergency a 12-member National Defense Council (headed by First Secretary of the Socialist—Communist—Unity party) will take control of the government and military.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (WEST)

Sept. 17—Elections for West Germany's fourth postwar, 479-member parliament are held.

Sept. 18—West German election returns show a drop in representation for Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union. The C.D.U. loses its majority in the parliament. The Free Democratic party makes the largest gain for a total of 66 seats. The C.D.U. and its Bavarian branch, Christian Social Union, win 241 seats; the Social Democrats, 190. All minor parties fail to receive the minimum 5 per cent of the national vote necessary to receive parliamentary representation.

Sept. 22—President Heinrich Lübke continues talks with party leaders over forming a new government.

Sept. 26—The Free Democratic party agrees to form a coalition government with any C.D.U. leader except Adenauer.

Sept. 29—Mende accepts an invitation from Adenauer for a meeting to discuss a coalition government. This is interpreted to mean that the Free Democratic party's opposition to Adenauer has been dropped.

GREECE

Sept. 8—Lieutenant General George Grivas' party loses 17 Liberal Deputies who had joined his National Regeneration Movement.

Sept. 19—Premier Constantin Karamanlis announces that he will ask King Paul to call general elections next month.

Sept. 20—King Paul dissolves Parliament and schedules new elections for October 29. Karamanlis has held office for almost 6 years; his term was due to expire in May, 1962.

HAITI

Sept. 19—It is announced that President Francois Duvalier has assumed control over the Haitian economy. The National Assembly last week voted Duvalier the power for such action.

HUNGARY

Sept. 13—The Hungarian Press Agency (M.T.I.) reports that Communist party First Secretary Janos Kadar has assumed the premiership, replacing Ferenc Muenich. Muennich's new job in the reorganized cabinet is Minister of State without portfolio.

INDONESIA (See also *The Netherlands*.)

Sept. 17—Indonesian President Sukarno leaves New York. Last week Sukarno and Mali President Modibo Keita delivered to U.S. President Kennedy a peace proposal agreed on at the Yugoslav meeting of neutral nations. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy and Int'l., Belgrade Conference*.)

Sept. 27—The Indonesian radio announces that Mohammad Natsir, a high-ranking rebel leader of the revolt in Sumatra in 1958, has surrendered.

IRAQ

Sept. 17—The Baghdad radio reports that Iraqi troops have broken up a rebellion by Kurdish tribesmen.

ISRAEL

Sept. 6—President Itzhak Ben-Zvi asks Mapai party leader David Ben-Gurion to form a coalition government, to end the caretaker government in effect since January.

Sept. 7—Ben-Gurion refuses to form a new government because he does not wish to yield to demands made by other parties.

Sept. 14—Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol tries to form a new government, acting on the request of President Itzhak Ben-Zvi. Eshkol is a member of the Mapai party.

Sept. 21—Israeli Arabs in Nazareth continue

protest demonstrations. Some 2,000 schoolboys participate in anti-Israeli shouting. The demonstration was caused by the killing of 5 Arab youths last Sunday and Monday, when they tried to flee to the Egyptian section of the Gaza strip.

ITALY

Sept. 23—The central committee of the Democratic Socialist party approves a resolution that it will continue to support Premier Amintore Fanfani's government until December.

Sept. 29—The Chamber of Deputies votes approval of Italy's strong support of Nato, following speeches by Fanfani and Foreign Minister Antonio Segni reiterating Italy's loyalty to the alliance.

JAPAN

Sept. 9—The U.S. and Japan agree on a 7-8 per cent quota increase for Japanese textile exports to the U.S.

Sept. 20—Japan delivers a note of protest to the U.S.S.R. because of Soviet resumption of nuclear tests.

Sept. 27—The Emperor Hirohito opens the Japanese Diet.

Sept. 29—A letter to Japanese Premier Hayato Ikeda from Premier Khrushchev is disclosed today. The Soviet Premier is reported to have reiterated that the presence of U.S. military bases in Japan constitutes a grave danger for the U.S.S.R. and for Japan. It is also reported that Khrushchev has rejected the possibility of returning to Japan her islands in the Southern Kurile group. The U.S.S.R. took over the islands following the second world war.

KOREA, NORTH

Sept. 17—The North Korean Communist party's fourth congress adopts a 7-year plan to better living conditions.

KOREA, SOUTH

Sept. 12—The U.S. White House announces that Lieutenant General Pak Chung Hi will visit President Kennedy. Pak is chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction of the Republic of Korea.

KUWAIT

Sept. 19—British troops begin a gradual evacuation of Kuwait. The British force

is being replaced by more than 2,000 troops sent by the Arab League to protect Kuwait against Iraqi intervention.

LAOS

Sept. 26—The 14-nation Geneva conference on Laos meets for the first time in 2 weeks.

The conference agrees on 7 minor points.

Sept. 27—It is reported that the 3 Laotian princes, representing right-wing, neutralist and leftist factions, will meet at Hin Heup within the next 2 weeks to discuss a government for the kingdom.

Sept. 28—The report of the International Control Commission on Laos is presented to the Soviet and British chairmen of the 14-nation Geneva conference. The report warns of the seriousness of the Laotian situation and urges agreement shortly among the 3 warring groups. The report, dated September 6, is circulated officially today.

LIBERIA

Sept. 12—President William V. S. Tubman asks the Liberian legislature to give him emergency powers to fight subversive elements in his country.

MOROCCO

Sept. 1—Morocco takes control of the last Spanish bases, evacuated by Spain yesterday. Spain announces that the evacuation of Spanish troops is now complete. Morocco declares that many Spanish troops remain on Moroccan soil in the north and south.

Sept. 21—Official sources reveal that Jews in Casablanca are now as free to travel abroad as Moroccan Muslims, for the first time in 5 years. The lifting of the passport restrictions applies to the Casablanca area, where half of the 180,000 Moroccan Jews reside.

Sept. 30—The Royal Moroccan Army parades at various points throughout Morocco to celebrate the completed withdrawal of French troops from Moroccan bases and the transfer of French military air schools to the Moroccan government. Some French troops remain at the U.S. naval and air base at Kenitra, which the U.S. has promised to evacuate by 1963. French Ambassador to Morocco Roger Seydoux, in a formal ceremony, turns over

the last French air base at Marrakesh to the Moroccan Defense Minister.

NETHERLANDS, THE

Sept. 26—Foreign Minister Joseph M. A. H. Luns tells the U.N. that The Netherlands is willing to cede jurisdiction of Netherlands New Guinea to the U.N. Indonesia has laid claim to Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian) for 12 years.

NORWAY

Sept. 11—Elections to the 150-seat Storting (Parliament) are held.

Sept. 12—Returns from the election give the ruling Labor party under Premier Einar Gerhardsen 74 seats in the Storting. The Labor party loses 4 seats and its majority, held since the second world war.

POLAND

Sept. 8—*Trybuna Ludu* (official Communist organ) publishes a Ministry of Education order restricting Catholic children's religious education. The order puts subject matter under government approval and curtails religious teaching to 2 hours weekly. About a year ago, religious classes in public schools were completely abolished so that religious teaching had to be taught after school hours in churches and parish halls.

Sept. 10—First Secretary of the Polish United Workers (Communist) party Wladyslaw Gomulka tells a Warsaw crowd that Poland is increasing its military preparedness in line with a communique issued by the Warsaw Pact. (See also *International, Warsaw Pact.*)

Sept. 17—The Roman Catholic Bishops of Poland in a pastoral letter read in all Catholic churches declare that the Church will not give up its job of educating Polish children. The letter also tells Catholic priests to refuse to accept money for religious teaching. The Ministry of Education has ordered all catechism teachers to register; those approved will be given salaries.

PORTUGAL

Angola

Sept. 21—It is reported that after 2 weeks of fighting against several thousand reb-

els, Portuguese troops have retaken the Pedras Verdes region.

SAUDI ARABIA

Sept. 11—The Saudi radio broadcasts a government announcement of a cabinet reorganization. Finance and Economics Minister Prince Telal ibn Abdul Aziz is ousted.

TUNISIA

Sept. 5—In a news conference, French President de Gaulle declares that France cannot evacuate its air and naval base at Bizerte until world tensions have eased.

Sept. 6—In a conciliatory vein, Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba asserts that de Gaulle has "finally recognized the principle of evacuation of Bizerte." He declares that the door is now open for negotiation.

Sept. 8—Bourguiba proposes a timetable be arranged for the eventual withdrawal of French troops in Bizerte; in the meantime, France can maintain the Bizerte base during the "present world crisis."

Sept. 10—French and Tunisians exchange prisoners in a first step toward reconciliation over Bizerte.

Sept. 18—French and Tunisian delegates reach agreement on a French troop withdrawal from the city of Bizerte and its surrounding territory.

Sept. 19—The withdrawal of French troops scheduled to begin this morning is postponed because of procedural difficulties.

Sept. 29—France and Tunisia sign an agreement providing for the evacuation of French troops from Bizerte city.

TURKEY

Sept. 15—A special court sentences former Premier Adnan Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatin Rustu Zorlu, Foreign Minister Hasan Polatkan, President Celal Bayar and 11 others to death.

Sept. 16—The ruling Committee of National Unity upholds the sentences of Menderes, Zorlu and Polatkan. Bayar and 11 others are given commuted sentences of life imprisonment.

Zorlu and Polatkan are hanged.

Sept. 17—Menderes is hanged for violating the Constitution during his 10 years as premier.

U.S.S.R., THE (See also *Int'l., Belgrade Conference, Berlin Crisis, Warsaw Pact.*)

Sept. 1—The U.S. White House announces that the Soviet Union has detonated its first nuclear explosion over Soviet Central Asia since 1958.

Sept. 7—Indian Prime Minister Nehru meets with Khrushchev for over 2 hours.

Sept. 10—In its fifth atomic blast, the Soviet Union sets off a nuclear device of "several megatons." The first 4 blasts were in the kiloton range.

Tass announces that between September 13 and October 15 the Soviet Union will test multi-stage space rockets, which will be fired into the Central Pacific.

Sept. 12—The seventh Soviet nuclear test, a multi-megaton explosion, is fired in the Arctic proving ground.

Sept. 13—Two more Soviet nuclear explosions, the eighth and ninth since nuclear testing was resumed September 1, occur.

Sept. 15—*Tass* announces that a "new, more powerful multistage carrier rocket" was successfully test fired on September 13. The rocket travelled 7,500 miles and hit within 1,000 yards of the target.

It is also reported that the Soviet Union has exploded its tenth nuclear bomb in the Arctic.

Sept. 18—*Tass* announces a second rocket test into the Central Pacific. This rocket too traveled 7,500 miles.

Sept. 20—Premier Khrushchev endorses Pope John XXIII's recent appeal for East-West negotiation to end world tension.

Sept. 21—It is disclosed that in letters to the leaders of non-aligned nations at Belgrade, September 1-5, Premier Khrushchev has asserted that he is willing to negotiate at any time to avoid armed conflict over Berlin and Germany.

Sept. 23—*Tass* announces that a third multistage rocket was successfully fired into the Pacific 2 days ago.

Sept. 30—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State

Dean Rusk meet for the third time during talks in New York on the Berlin question.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Sept. 2—The U.S. will supply the Egyptian region with wheat, flour and maize for a total of \$64.5 million (to be paid in Egyptian pounds). The U.S. will waive 15 per cent of the cost.

Sept. 28—In a pre-dawn attack, dissident Syrian army units under Syrian leaders rebel. They take control of the Damascus radio and other key points in the city. Field Marshall Abdel Hakim Amer, commander in chief of the U.A.R. armed forces, and Commander of the First Army General Gamal Feisal are surrounded in First Army Headquarters. Later they are allowed to fly to Cairo to present rebel demands to President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Sept. 29—The Syrian revolutionary command sets up a civilian government for Syria and announces Syrian independence from the U.A.R. Nasser withdraws the order sending Egyptian forces to quell the revolt. The new Syrian government will be led by Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense Mahmoud al-Kuzbari. Kuzbari names a Cabinet of 10 men, empowered by rebel leaders to rule by decree.

The new Syrian government announces it will rule by decree only until new elections for a parliament can be held.

Jordan and Turkey declare their formal recognition of the new Syrian government.

Sept. 30—The Syrian government issues a communique ordering the deportation of all Egyptian soldiers and civil servants from Syria.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

Sept. 9—The Civil Rights Commission reports to Congress on its study of Southern discriminatory voting practices. It is unanimously recommended that Congress declare sixth grade education sufficient qualification for voting as far as literacy is concerned; four out of six members recommend that Congress void all state

voter qualification tests except for those regarding age, residency, imprisonment or conviction for felony.

Foreign Policy

- Sept. 5—Marvin William Makinen, an American tourist, is sentenced to eight years detention as a spy in Russia by a Soviet military court.
- Sept. 7—President Kennedy asks Congress to allow French forces in West Germany under Nato to receive nuclear weapons training; no weapons are to be transferred.
- Sept. 12—President Kennedy confers with Indonesian President Sukarno and Mali President Modibo Keita; the neutral leaders are to share the "thoughts and concerns" of the Belgrade conferees with the President.
- Sept. 13—Kennedy tells the neutral leaders that he will consider summit talks with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev only when they will serve a useful purpose.
- Sept. 14—British, French and American foreign ministers begin discussions on Berlin, Laos and the Congo in Washington.
- Sept. 19—Kennedy greets Peruvian President Manuel Prado y Ugarteche in Washington.
- Sept. 22—Kennedy makes the Peace Corps permanent in a bill signed today.
- Sept. 23—Secretary of State Dean Rusk talks to Cento representatives about defense procurement problems.
- Sept. 24—Attorney General Robert Kennedy says his brother, President Kennedy, will order nuclear warfare if necessary to safeguard the freedom of West Berlin.
- Sept. 25—Kennedy addresses the United Nations; he offers a new disarmament plan, and indicates that the U.S. holds its firm stand on Berlin but will negotiate a settlement.
- Kennedy confers about Laos and other matters with Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk.
- Sept. 26—Kennedy names William C. Foster director of the new United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, after signing legislation creating this new body.
- Sept. 30—Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko confer for the third time in New York on the Berlin crisis; the talks are de-

scribed as "useful." (For further information see *International, Berlin Crisis*.)

Government

- Sept. 4—Virginia's Senator Harry F. Byrd reports that the federal payroll for civilian employees reached an all-time high in fiscal 1961: \$13,648,000,000.
- The President signs a bill authorizing \$4,253,500,000 for foreign aid; development loan commitments totalling \$7.2 billion through June 30, 1966, are authorized.
- Sept. 6—Charles W. Cole is named Ambassador to Chile.
- Sept. 15—Steuart L. Pittman is confirmed as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense.
- A compromise immigration bill is sent to the White House: 18,000 "second and third preference immigrants" who asked for admission before July 1 are to be allowed to enter in addition to normal quota entries. The Alien Orphan Act is also made permanent.
- Sept. 16—Kennedy receives the Delaware River compact providing federal-state partnership in developing resources of the Delaware River. New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware legislatures have already approved the measure.
- Sept. 18—Kennedy receives legislation providing for extension of the National Defense Education Act and the program of educational aid for "impacted areas" for two years. The two programs will cost an estimated \$900 million.
- Sept. 20—Fowler Hamilton is named administrator of the new Agency for International Development.
- Sept. 27—Kennedy names John A. McCone as director of the Central Intelligence Agency succeeding Allen W. Dulles.
- The first session of the Eighty-Seventh Congress adjourns at dawn; the House adjourns at 4:20 a.m. forcing the Senate to adjourn at 6:16 a.m.
- The total appropriation voted by the first session of the Eighty-Seventh Congress is a record \$95.8 million.
- Sept. 30—More than \$9 billion in appropriations bills are signed by the President, including a foreign aid and related projects appropriation of \$4,123,345,000; \$3.912 billion of this is for foreign aid.

Labor

Sept. 3—The new minimum wage requirements go into effect: workers formerly covered now receive a \$1.15 minimum hourly wage; newly covered workers are now paid a \$1.00 hourly minimum.

Sept. 5—Kennedy asks the General Motors Corporation and the United Automobile Workers to try to avoid a strike.

Sept. 6—A tentative agreement is reached between General Motors and the U.A.W.

Sept. 11—At 92 General Motors plants, workers strike; a major issue is the union's request for more relief time away from the assembly lines. Other differences among union locals negate the economic accord of September 6.

Sept. 20—The strike at General Motors ends, with the union and General Motors agreeing on a three-year contract with wage increases and increased job protection.

Sept. 29—Reversing a former opinion, the National Labor Relations Board rules 4 to 1 that in the "right to work" state of Indiana, an agency shop agreement is legal. An agency shop agreement requires non-union employees to pay the equivalent of dues and fees to the union to hold their jobs.

Military Policy

Sept. 6—The Department of Defense orders 148,000 reservists to "combat readiness."

Sept. 9—The Defense Department reveals it is sending 40,000 Army troops to Europe "in the immediate future."

Sept. 12—Discoverer XXX goes into polar orbit.

Sept. 13—A robot Mercury capsule is orbited and safely returned to earth.

Sept. 15—The U.S. renews atomic tests with an underground explosion in Nevada. (See also *International, Disarmament.*)

Sept. 16—A second nuclear device is tested underground in Nevada.

Sept. 17—Discoverer XXXI is orbited.

Sept. 19—The Defense Department calls 73,000 reservists to active duty October 15.

Sept. 20—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration names D. Brainerd Holmes as director of manned space flight programs.

Politics

Sept. 27—Former Vice-President Richard M. Nixon says he will run for Governor of California in 1962, and that he will not be a candidate for the presidency in 1964.

Segregation

Sept. 1—A federal grand jury indicts nine men for bombing a "freedom rider" bus in Alabama, on May 14.

Sept. 6—In New Rochelle, New York, 267 pupils are transferred from a predominantly Negro school to 11 other schools.

Eight elementary schools in Dallas, Texas, are integrated; 18 Negro children enter the schools without trouble.

Sept. 7—12 Negro children attend integrated schools in New Orleans.

Sept. 15—15 ministers including 3 Negroes are sentenced to jail for trying to dine in a segregated restaurant in Jackson, Mississippi.

Sept. 18—3 Negroes join the student body at Georgia Tech, which is voluntarily being desegregated.

Sept. 22—The Interstate Commerce Commission sets up rules to prohibit racial discrimination in interstate bus transportation, including terminal facilities.

VATICAN, THE

Sept. 10—Pope John XXIII voices an appeal to leaders of the East and West to negotiate a solution to end the threat of war.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Sept. 14—A military communiqué announces that government troops killed 302 guerrillas and took 357 prisoners during the month of August.

Sept. 19—An attack by 1,500 Viet Cong rebel troops on Phuoc Minh, 60 miles from Saigon, is reported.

Sept. 22—It is reported that Viet Cong rebels have also attacked a post in Daclar Province. South Vietnam Civil Guards there are believed to have been wiped out.

YUGOSLAVIA

Sept. 26—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koca Popovic tells the U.N. General Assembly that the Soviet Union has assumed "a very heavy responsibility" because of renewed nuclear tests.

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